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MOMMY OR DADDY AND ME:
A CONTRACT SOLUTION TO A CHILD'S LOSS OF
THE LESBIAN OR TRANSGENDER
NONBIOLOGICAL PARENT
INTRODUCrION
After five years in a committed lesbian relationship, Susan and Jane
want to start a family. Unable to conceive a child together, they de-
cide to use artificial insemination (AI). Prior to undergoing Al, Su-
san, Jane, and their doctor sign an agreement stating that both
partners will be co-parents of the child. Susan is then inseminated
with an anonymous donor's semen. Jane has no biological role in con-
ception. A girl is born-Lesley-and Susan and Jane raise her to-
gether. Ten years later, Susan and Jane decide to split up. After they
tell ten-year-old Lesley the news, Jane moves out of the family home
and the child remains with Susan. As tensions escalate between the
ex-partners, Susan eventually decides to end Lesley's relationship with
Jane. Lesley, who has spent ten years with two mothers, is now denied
the emotional, mental, and financial support of a woman she has al-
ways known as "Mom."
Jane hires an attorney to establish custody and visitation rights, but
her attorney warns her that it is unlikely the courts will grant either.
The attorney tells Jane that although the three of them have been liv-
ing as a family for over a decade, the law in their state only explicitly
provides protections for heterosexual nonbiological parents. The
courts will not enforce Susan and Jane's legal parentage agreement
because the state's Parentage Act only deems such agreements en-
forceable for heterosexual couples. Furthermore, while the state has
recognized the applicability of certain common law parentage doc-
trines in nonbiological parents' parental rights cases, the state su-
preme court has refused to apply these doctrines to lesbian
nonbiological parents who were never married to the biological par-
ents. Although Susan and Jane had essentially functioned as a mar-
ried couple for over a decade, they were never able to legally marry
under state law.
When Jane commenced action to gain custody of Lesley, the court
denied her custody and visitation, holding that she did not have legal
standing as a lesbian, unmarried, and nonbiological parent. There-
fore, after a lifetime with a two-parent family, her ten-year-old girl
experienced the traumatic loss of her mother.
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Unfortunately for children conceived through Al by lesbian or
transgenderl couples, Jane's experience is an increasingly common
problem. 2 Lesbian and transgender nonbiological parents3 face
unique barriers to establishing parentage of their children after the
deterioration of their relationships with the biological parents. 4 The
determination of parentage is of "profound" significance in a custody
or visitation proceeding.5 A nonbiological parent "must have standing
... to seek custody or visitation before a court will address the merits
of the petition." 6 While legal parents both have standing to bring an
action for custody or visitation rights after the termination of their
1. Transgender is an umbrella term that refers to people who live differently than
the gender presentation and roles expected of them by society.. . .Transsexual is a term
for people who seek to live in a gender different from the one assigned at birth and who
may seek or want medical intervention (through hormones and/or surgery) for them to
live comfortably in that gender.
National Center for Transgender Equality, Teaching Transgender 15-16 (2009), available at http:/
/transequality.org/Resources/NCTETeachingTransgender.pdf.
2. See Bettina Boxall, Laws Mean Lesbian Custody Battles Often Are One-Sided, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 1997, at Al ("[A] [c]ouple break[s] up, share[s] the child's custody for a while. Then the
biological mother, often after forming a new relationship, starts limiting her former partner's
visits with the child, sometimes stopping them altogether. The woman discovers that however
long the child may have called her 'mom,' she is a nobody to the law."); see also Jonathan Saltz-
man, Partner Child Support at Issue, BosToN GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2004, at B1 (quoting Bennett H.
Klein, a lawyer for Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders: "One of the realities of the world
today is that more and more children are being born through reproductive technologies where
they have a biological connection to one parent and not to the other . . . . Part of the reason
we're seeing this case is because the law has not fully caught up with that reality.").
3. While gay men may also have difficulty establishing parentage when using Al to conceive a
child through a surrogate mother, this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an expla-
nation of legal barriers to gay men's parental rights under current Al and surrogacy law, see
generally Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
147 (2000).
4. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Ma-
ternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 Bure. L. REV. 341, 345 (2002); see also David
Crary, Lesbians Face Custody Battleground Law: When Female Partners Separate After Rearing
Children, One May Find Herself Cut off and Without Recourse, L.A. TIMEs (Oct. 24, 1999), http:/
/articles.latimes.com/1999/oct/24/news/mn-25720 ("[Wirenching cases are surfacing across the
nation as more lesbian partners rear children born after artificial insemination. When such
couples separate, dissolving a union that no state recognizes as marriage, the partner who is not
the biological parent finds herself in legal limbo.").
5. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 471
(1990).
6. Laurie A. Rompala, Abandoned Equity and the Best Interests of the Child: Why Illinois
Courts Must Recognize Same-Sex Parents Seeking Visitation, 76 Cm-KErr L. REV. 1933, 1934
(2001).
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relationship,7 nonlegal parents are often denied standing to bring an
action at all.8
In heterosexual relationships, both parents are often biological and
legal parents to the children. If one or both parents in a heterosexual
couple are not biological parents, presumptions of parentage in state
law usually apply if the parties intended to raise the child together.9
However, courts often refuse to grant parentage to lesbian and trans-
gender nonbiological parents in similar circumstances.' 0 These nonbi-
ological parents are often denied standing to pursue custody or
visitation." In these cases, the child suffers the trauma of losing a fit' 2
and caring parent.' 3
The relevant statutory lawl 4 and common law parentage doctrines
governing these issues vary widely across jurisdictions.' 5 Part II of
this Comment reviews the current status of parentage statutes and
common law doctrines that courts apply to cases in which nonbiologi-
cal parents claim parentage.16 Different states have adopted the 1973
version of the Uniform Parentage Act, the 2000 version of the Uni-
form Parentage Act, or neither.' 7 Because the Al sections of state
parentage statutes usually include gender-specific language, courts
7. See Polikoff, supra note 5, at 471 n.47 (citing MiNN. STAT. § 518.17(3) (West Supp. 2005)
("In determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of each child and shall not
prefer one parent over the other solely on the basis of the sex of the parent.") and WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.09.002 (2005) ("In any proceeding between parents under this chapter, the best inter-
ests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties'
parental responsibilities.")).
8. See Polikoff, supra note 5, at 472.
9. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 371-72.
10. See infra notes 43-102 and accompanying text.
11. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 345; see also Crary, supra note 4 ("Courts in many ... states
have sided categorically with the biological mother in such disputes, ruling that estranged lesbian
partners have no more legal right to demand visitation than a long-term nanny or close family
friend.").
12. Non-heterosexual parents are not "unfit" by definition due to their sexual orientation.
See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, What's Good for the Kids, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 2009, at 9 ("In most ways,
the accumulated research shows, children of same-sex parents are not markedly different from
those of heterosexual parents. They show no increased incidence of psychiatric disorders, are
just as popular at school and have just as many friends.").
13. See, e.g., In re Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that
when lesbian nonbiological parents are considered "legal strangers," children can be "denied the
affection of a 'parent' who has been with them from birth").
14. DeLair, supra note 3, at 162 n.135 ("Many states have not enacted any statutes dealing
with assisted reproductive technologies."). The following discussion on parentage statutes illus-
trates how state courts have interpreted identical statutes differently, especially in regards to
lesbian and transgender nonbiological parents.
15. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 348.
16. See infra notes 43-215 and accompanying text.
17. Kira Horstmeyer, Note, Putting Your Eggs in Someone Else's Basket: Inserting Uniformity
into the Uniform Parentage Act's Treatment of Assisted Reproduction, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
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often hold that these statutes do not apply to lesbian or transgender
couples.'8 Without statutory recourse, lesbian or transgender nonbio-
logical parents sometimes request that courts apply common law doc-
trines to their parentage claims.19 However, the common law
doctrines often result in dramatically different results across jurisdic-
tions. Some courts refuse to accept these doctrines in the context of
lesbian or transgender nonbiological parentage claims at all. 20
Part III of this Comment demonstrates that the inconsistent stat-
utes, doctrines, and applications of law in this area lead to inconsistent
and inequitable results for lesbian and transgender parents, disregard-
ing both the autonomy of the parties and the best interests of the chil-
dren.21 This Part proposes the use of contract law in all Al parentage
determinations. 22 Biological and nonbiological parents often sign pre-
insemination AI agreements, illustrating their intent to co-parent the
resulting children. If courts recognize the children of these parties as
the intended third-party beneficiaries of pre-insemination AI agree-
ments, the children should be entitled to specific performance of these
agreements. 23 The specific performance under such agreements is the
nonbiological parent's promise to be a legal parent and to provide
physical, mental, emotional, and financial support for the child.24
Part IV of this Comment illustrates that despite judicial resistance
to applying contract law in a family law context, a contractual ap-
proach is appropriate in determining parentage of children conceived
through AI. 2 5 The contract framework ensures uniform and equitable
results, as it will not distinguish between heterosexual, homosexual, or
transgender parents. 26 It also respects the best interest of the children
and the parents' autonomous decisions to create families.27 For these
reasons, courts should use a child-focused contract approach for cus-
tody disputes between biological and nonbiological parents.
671, 700 (2007) ("[C]onsistency across the country in this area of family law is a desirable
objective.").
18. Id. at 675.
19. See John E. Durkin, Comment, Reproductive Technology and the New Family: Recogniz-
ing the Other Mother, 10 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 327, 332 (1994).
20. Lindsy J. Rohlf, Note, The Psychological-Parent and De Facto-Parent Doctrines: How
Should the Uniform Parentage Act Define "Parent"?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 691, 700 (2009).
21. See infra notes 216-65 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 266-313 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 291-313 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 301-13 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 350-85 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
Couples who wish to start a family often turn to assisted reproduc-
tive technologies when they cannot or will not conceive through sex-
ual intercourse. 28 Assisted reproductive technologies include "(a)
[i]ntrauterine insemination; (b) [d]onation of eggs; (c) [d]onation of
embryos; (d) [iun-vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and (e)
[i]ntracytoplasmic sperm injection." 29 Al is "the 'introduction of se-
men into a woman's vagina or uterus, other than by sexual inter-
course."' 30 While the first human Al procedure was performed in the
United States in 1866,31 women out of heterosexual wedlock have
only begun to use Al over the last several decades. 32 Because lesbian
and transgender couples cannot conceive children through sexual in-
tercourse, many now use assisted reproductive technologies, such as
AI, to conceive children.33 According to a recent estimate by the
American Bar Association, approximately ten million children are be-
ing raised by gay, lesbian, or bisexual parents34 in the United States.35
While some state legislatures have enacted statutes designed to es-
tablish the parentage of nonbiological parents of children conceived
28. See Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the Law, 23
VT. L. REV. 225, 225 (1998).
29. ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY § 102(1) (2008).
30. See DeLair, supra note 3, at 149 (quoting U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY As-
SESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY OF A 1987
SURVEY-BACKGROUND POPER 7 (1988)).
31. Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for
an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 n.3 (1981).
32. Carmel B. Sella, When a Mother Is a Legal Stranger to Her Child: The Law's Challenge to
the Lesbian Nonbiological Mother, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 135, 151 n.77 (1991) (citing Kritchev-
sky, supra note 31, at 1).
33. Valerie Kellogg, How the Children of the Gay Baby Boom Are Faring, NEWSDAY, July 10,
2001, at B10 ("Many of those families have evolved out of divorce, but gays and lesbians, alone
or with a partner, are also turning to adoption, artificial insemination, foster care and surrogacy
to start the families they may have always wanted but didn't expect they could have."); see also
Jane E. Brody, Gay Families Flourish as Acceptance Grows, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at. F7
("[Miore and more gay couples are acquiring their own [children], through artificial insemina-
tion, adoption and, for some gay men, through a surrogate mother inseminated with their
sperm."); Gina Kolata, Lesbian Partners Find the Means to Be Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1989,
at A13 ("[T]housands of lesbians around the country are having children.... [M]ore and more
of these women are choosing to have their own babies, most often by artificial insemination.").
34. There are no statistics available on the number of children being raised by transgender
parents at this time. According to the National Center for Transgender Equality, there are
somewhere between one million and three million transgender people living in America. See
Russell Goldman, 'My Mommy Is a Boy,' ABC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/
Health/story?id=4536604&page=1. How many of them are parents, however, is unknown. Id.
35. See Kellogg, supra note 33, at BlO ("As many as 10 million children are living with gay,
lesbian or bisexual parents in the United States, according to estimates by the American Bar
Association.").
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through AI, the vast majority of these statutes do not explicitly in-
clude lesbian or transgender couples within their scope. 36 Therefore,
although some courts adopt a gender-neutral interpretation of parent-
age statutes to grant parental status to lesbian or transgender nonbio-
logical parents, others consider the nonbiological lesbian or
transgender parents to be legal strangers to the children and "decline
to expand the current laws to recognize the nonbiological partner's
parental rights."37 Furthermore, while some courts have used various
common law doctrines of functional parenthood to grant nonbiologi-
cal parents their parental status, others may grant partial parental
rights or refuse to grant parentage at all under these doctrines.38
Section A of this Part examines the different parentage statutes
adopted by the states and the various interpretations of those statutes
by different state courts.39 It also discusses a potential trend among a
few states of adopting gender-neutral language and interpretation.40
Section B of this Part reviews the current status of several common
law doctrines that courts sometimes apply in cases where nonbiologi-
cal parents claim parentage of children conceived through AI.4 1 Fi-
nally, Section C notes that some lesbian or transgender nonbiological
parents may attempt to sidestep the issues associated with statutory or
common law remedies through second-parent adoption. 42
A. Parentage Statutes
When determining parentage, "[c]ourts have traditionally applied
statutory law." 4 3 Historically, however, states did not have statutes
regulating the parental rights and obligations of nonbiological parents
to children conceived through AI. 4 4 Without a legal standard, chil-
36. Many state parentage statutes are modeled after the Al sections of the UPA (1973) or the
UPA (2000). Both of these Al sections include gender-specific language, which, if interpreted
strictly, would exclude lesbian and transgender couples. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 703
(2000) (revised 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 5(a) (1973).
37. Betsy J. Walter, Note, Lesbian Mediation: Resolving Custody and Visitation Disputes
When Couples End Their Relationships, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 104, 106 (2003).
38. See infra notes 138-206 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 43-102 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 103-37 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 138-206 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
43. Micah Nilsson, You Can't Force Her to Be a Second Mom: K.M. v. E.G., 10 U.C. DAVIS J.
Juv. L. & PoL'Y 479, 484 (2006).
44. Walter Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64 Nw.
U. L. REV. 777, 785 (1970) ("Most of the legal profession today is either in ignorance or in hiding
concerning artificial insemination. Until recently a handful of British Commonwealth decisions
and a few trial court cases, not always officially reported, were the only sources available upon
which to construct a legal framework for the process.").
1120 [Vol. 60:1115
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dren born to married or unmarried couples through AI were found
"illegitimate." 4 5 In 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (the Conference) proposed a comprehensive
set of model laws regarding parentage rights, including a section on
the parentage of children conceived through AI.4 6 The Conference
aimed to create a uniform application of parentage law across jurisdic-
tions.47 However, many states have adopted variations of the model
laws or no statutes at all, and state courts have interpreted identical
statutes differently.48 Therefore, conflicts still arise when courts at-
tempt to determine the parental status of lesbian or transgender
nonbiological parents. 49
1. The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act
The stated purpose of the original Uniform Parentage Act (UPA
(1973)) is to uniformly provide "substantive legal equality of children
regardless of the marital status of their parents."50 The Conference
noted that a series of Supreme Court decisions had mandated equal
legal treatment of children born in and out of wedlock under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically
as it relates to intestate succession.5' However, much of the law
across jurisdictions was, at the time, "either unconstitutional or sub-
ject to grave constitutional doubt."52 Concerned with every child's
ability to assert her equal legal rights, the Conference established a
network of presumptions and rules to identify the child's legal
parents.53
However, while other sections of the UPA (1973) ensure equal
treatment for children born in and out of wedlock, § 5 of the UPA
(1973), which specifically addresses the parentage issues involving
children conceived through Al, states that if "a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the hus-
band is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived." 54 Despite the Conference's stated goal of equal-
45. Id. at 785-86.
46. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr prefatory note (1973).
47. Id.
48. See DeLair, supra note 3, at 162 n.135 ("Many states have not enacted any statu[t]es deal-
ing with assisted reproductive technologies.").
49. See Nilsson, supra note 43, at 484.
50. UPA (1973) prefatory note.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. UPA (1973) § 5(a) (emphasis added).
2011] 1121
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izing the treatment of children born in and out of wedlock, the use of
the terms "husband" and "wife" excludes unmarried couples and their
children conceived through Al from the parentage protections of the
UPA.55
Eight states adopted § 5 of the UPA (1973).56 Other UPA (1973)
states did not adopt § 5, but two of these states enacted similar Al
sections.57 In states that follow the UPA (1973), courts often refuse to
apply the Al section protections to lesbian and transgender nonbio-
logical parents. For example, Missouri adopted the UPA (1973) in
1987,58 and in 2009, a Missouri appellate court refused to apply the Al
section of the parentage statute to a dispute between former lesbian
partners.59 In White v. White, Michelle and Leslea each conceived one
child through Al, in 2001 and 2004 respectively, and raised the two
children together as a family. 60 Each partner was the biological par-
ent to one child and the nonbiological parent to the other child.61 Af-
ter the relationship ended in 2005, Leslea sought joint parental rights
to both children.62 Michelle, however, sought to deny Leslea any pa-
rental rights to Michelle's biological child.63 Leslea attempted to es-
tablish parentage of her nonbiological child through the Missouri
parentage statute.64 The court held that the Missouri statute only al-
55. Id.
56. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-
106(1)-(2) (West 2005); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3 (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West
2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (2009); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 126.061 (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2002); see also John J. Samp-
son, Uniform Family Laws and Models Acts, 42 FAM. L.Q. 673, 681 (2008) (noting that Califor-
nia, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Ohio, and Rhode Island have all adopted the UPA (1973)).
Hawaii and Rhode Island did not adopt the AI sections of the UPA (1973). See HAw. REV.
STAT. § 584-1-584-26 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-1-15-8-28 (2010). New Mexico's law is simi-
lar to the UPA (2000) but is gender neutral. The New Mexico statute states, "A person who
provides eggs, sperm or embryos for or consents to assisted reproduction as provided in Section
7-704 of the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act with the intent to be the parent of a child is a
parent of the resulting child." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
57. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (2007); OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95 (LexisNexis
2008).
58. "If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a
wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is
treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived." Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.824 (West 2010).
59. See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 9. Leslea also stated claims for relief on the basis of her being the de facto parent of,
or one standing in loco parentis to, Michelle's biological child. Id. at 11. Leslea also claimed that
1122 [Vol. 60:1115
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lowed claims for parentage rights based on a biological tie or a pre-
sumption of parentage due to marriage or attempted marriage.65 As a
former partner in a non-marital relationship with no biological ties to
Michelle's biological child, Leslea could not assert parental rights to
the child under the Missouri statute.66
Transgender nonbiological parents face unique issues in parentage
claims under statutes that include the terms "husband" and "wife." In
some states, a marriage involving a transsexual partner may be de-
clared an invalid same-sex marriage if that partner has not completed
the sex reassignment process.67 In In re Marriage of Simmons, an Illi-
nois appellate court refused to apply the Illinois Parentage Act 6 8 to a
custody dispute between a female-to-male transsexual nonbiological
parent and a female biological parent, despite the fact that they were
married. 69 During their marriage, the female partner was inseminated
with donor sperm.70 Prior to insemination, both the female partner
and the transsexual male partner signed a parentage agreement,71 as
Michelle was equitably estopped from refuting the parent-child relationship between Leslea and
Michelle's biological child. Id. These issues are discussed later in this Comment.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Among the states, "there is not uniformity in whether, and how, a birth certificate can be
modified for surgically treated transsexuals." See Richard Green, Transsexual Legal Rights in
the United States and United Kingdom: Employment, Medical Treatment, and Civil Status, 39
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 153, 156 (2010). Some states will only recognize a marriage
with a transsexual partner if he has completed sexual reassignment surgery and is legally the
opposite sex of his partner. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 309 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2005). Other states do not recognize a postoperative transsexual's marriage within the reas-
signed sex. See, e.g., Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("[Tlhe
Florida statutes governing marriage [do not] authorize a postoperative transsexual to marry in
the reassigned sex.").
68. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(a) (2008). The Al section of the statute, adopted from the UPA
(1973), states,
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband,
a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the
husband shall be treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby con-
ceived. The husband's consent must be in writing executed and acknowledged by both
the husband and wife. The physician who is to perform the technique shall certify their
signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent in the medi-
cal record where it shall be kept confidential and held by the patient's physician. How-
ever, the physician's failure to do so shall not affect the legal relationship between
father and child.
Id.
69. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 311.
70. Id.
71. The agreement stated,
It is further agreed that [at] the moment of conception the husband hereby accepts
the act as his own, and agrees:
1. That such child or children so produced are his own legitimate child or children and
are heirs of his body; and
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required by the Al section of the Illinois Parentage Act.7 2 When their
relationship deteriorated, the nonbiological parent filed a petition for
the dissolution of marriage and sought custody of the child.73
The biological parent alleged that the nonbiological parent lacked
standing because the same-sex marriage was invalid under Illinois law,
and he was neither the biological nor adoptive parent. 74 The nonbio-
logical parent argued that he was a parent under the Illinois Parentage
Act.75 The court interpreted the Illinois Parentage Act, which uses
the terms "husband" and "wife" in the AI section, to include only
legally married couples in its scope.76 While the transsexual nonbio-
logical parent underwent several surgeries in the sex reassignment
process during the marriage, he still had external female genitalia at
the time of the dispute.77 Therefore, the court held that the nonbio-
logical parent was not legally male, and the couple's marriage was an
invalid same-sex marriage.78 The nonbiological parent did not have
standing to seek custody of the child under the Illinois Parentage
Act.79
2. The 2000 Uniform Parentage Act
In 2000, the Conference promulgated a new Uniform Parentage Act
to replace the UPA (1973) as the official recommendation of the Con-
ference on the subject of parentage.80 The Conference explained that
the new laws were necessary because "[c]ase law has not always
reached consistent results in construing UPA (1973). Moreover,
2. That he hereby completely waives forever any right which he might have to disclaim
such child or children as his own; and
3. That such child or children so procedure [sic] are, and shall be considered to be, in
all respects including descent of property, child or children of his own body.
Id. at 310 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
72. See supra note 68.
73. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 308. The nonbiological parent also alleged that his marriage was valid because he
was legally male, or alternatively that he was a parent under common law doctrine. Id. at 308,
312.
76. Id. at 311.
77. Id. at 309.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 313. The court also ruled that he did not have standing under common law doctrines
because standing must be found solely under Illinois statutes. Id. See also Kantaras v. Kantaras,
884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), which reversed a trial court decision that a female-
born transsexual nonbiological parent was legally male and invalidated his marriage. The appel-
late court held that Florida statutes governing marriage do not authorize a postoperative
transsexual to marry in the reassigned sex. Id. The court held that the terms "male" and "fe-
male" refer to "immutable traits determined at birth." Id.
80. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr prefatory note (2000) (revised 2002).
1124 [Vol. 60:1115
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widely differing treatment on subjects not dealt with by the Act has
been common."8' The Conference also noted that the law needed to
keep up with new technologies and resulting legal issues, such as the
increased use of assisted conception. 82 While the 2000 version of the
UPA (UPA (2000)) originally used the terms "husband" and "wife" in
its Al section, the 2002 amendments replaced those terms with "man"
and "woman."8 3
The revised UPA (2000) aimed to modernize the model parentage
laws by applying the assisted reproduction provisions to children born
in and out of wedlock." Section 703 of the revised UPA (2000) states
that "[a] man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted repro-
duction by a woman as provided in [§] 704 with the intent to be the
parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child."85 The AI sec-
tion of the revised UPA (2000) made two major changes from the
UPA (1973): the revised UPA (2000) lists the parents as "man" and
"woman" instead of "husband" and "wife," ending the exclusion of
unmarried couples, and bases parentage on the intent of the nonbio-
logical parents to raise the children conceived through AI.86 Nine
states have adopted the original or revised UPA (2000).17 Eight of
those states currently use the Al section of the original or revised
UPA (2000).88
Regardless of the new focus on the nonbiological parent's intent to
parent the child,8 9 at least one state has still refused to apply its par-
entage statute to lesbian nonbiological parents who expressed an in-
81. Id.
82. UPA (2000) § 702 cmt.
83. UPA (2000) §§ 702 cmt., 703.
84. Id.
85. UPA (2000) § 703 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. ALA. CODE § 26-17-703 (LexisNexis 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-703 (2009); N.M.
STAT. § 40-11A-703 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-61 (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 552 (West 2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.703 (Vernon 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-
703 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710 (West 2005); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-903
(2009).
88. ALA. CODE § 26-17-703; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 703; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-61;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.703; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78b-15-
703; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-903.
Four of these states adopted the pre-amendment version of the UPA (2000), which still uses
the terms "husband" and "wife" instead of "man" and "woman." See ALA. CODE § 26-17-703;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-703; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.26.710.
89. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 170 (Wash. 2005) ("[T]he UPA establishes that at
least in the case of artificial insemination, the intent of the parties is the principal inquiry in
determining legal parentage.").
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tent to parent the children. 0 In In re Parentage of L.B.,9' the
Supreme Court of Washington stated that a lesbian nonbiological par-
ent did not have a statutory remedy in the Washington parentage stat-
ute.92 The court held that the Al section of the statute, which
included the terms "husband" and "wife,"93 did not apply to same-sex
couples.94 The court stated that the "legislature has been conspicu-
ously silent when it comes to the rights of children like L.B., who are
born into nontraditional families, including any interests they may
have in maintaining their relationships with the members of the family
unit in which they are raised." 95 However, the court recognized the
status of de facto parent96 as a means of determining parentage in
addition to the UPA (2000).97 The court remanded the case for a de-
termination of whether the nonbiological parent was a de facto
parent.98
Although the Conference noted that there was a need for a new
model parentage law due to inconsistent interpretations of the UPA
(1973) and the increasing prevalence of assisted reproduction in mari-
tal and nonmarital families, 99 only nine states adopted either the origi-
nal or the revised UPA (2000).100 Similar to the UPA (1973), the
revised UPA (2000) excluded same-sex couples from its Al parentage
protections by specifying that the section is only applicable to a couple
that includes a "man" and "woman."10' While the revised UPA
(2000) states differ on how they enforce and interpret the Al section
of their statutes, at least one state has refused to apply the UPA
(2000) to a lesbian nonbiological parent.102
90. Id. at 163.
91. The nonbiological parent in this case did not actually claim that she was a parent under the
AI section of the Washington UPA, but the court still made a point to say that the entire UPA
did not apply in this case. See id. at 166 n.5.
92. Id. at 166. The nonbiological parent also stated claims for relief on the basis of her being
the de facto parent of the child. This issue will be discussed later in this Comment.
93. "If a husband provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by his wife ... he is
the father of a resulting child born to his wife." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710.
94. L.B., 122 P.3d at 169.
95. Id.
96. De facto parentage is a common law doctrine discussed below. See infra notes 142-74 and
accompanying text.
97. See L.B., 122 P.3d at 166-77.
98. Id. at 180.
99. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr prefatory note (2000) (revised 2002).
100. See sources cited supra note 87.
101. See UPA (2000) § 703.
102. L.B., 122 P.3d at 166 n.5.
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3. Gender-Neutral Trends
As discussed above, state parentage statutes often do not directly
address the parentage of lesbian or transgender nonbiological parents
whose partners conceive children through Al. Recently, however,
some courts have applied a gender-neutral interpretation of parentage
statutes to oblige a same-sex partner to pay child support, and even to
recognize the legal parenthood of same-sex partners.103 For example,
the New Jersey Parentage Act specifically refers to "husbands" and
"wives," seemingly excluding lesbian and transgender nonbiological
parents from its scope.104 Yet in In re Parentage of Robinson, the New
Jersey state trial court granted a lesbian nonbiological parent legal
parent status despite the statutory exclusion of same-sex couples. 05
The couple established domestic partnership under New York law in
2003 and was married in Canada in 2004.106 Shortly thereafter, they
moved to New Jersey to be closer to family and friends once they
started a family.107
When one of the partners was artificially inseminated, the couple
sought a pre-birth order establishing that the nonbiological parent was
the second legal parent to the child. 08 Although the New Jersey Par-
entage Act specifically referred to "husbands" and "wives,"1 09 the
couple argued that "'[t]o deny the children of same-sex partners the
security of a legally recognized relationship with their second parent
serves no legitimate state interest,"' and that construing the Al statute
to include same-sex couples would serve the best interest of the
child."0 The court noted that the couple had "availed themselves of
every legal opportunity open to them to declare they [were] commit-
ted domestic partners, a married couple and a dedicated family.""'
Taking into account the strong public policy that the state must focus
on the best interests of the children, the court held that the child was
103. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005); In
re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1042 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005); Shineovich v.
Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
104. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2002).
105. Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1042.
106. Id. at 1037.
107. Id. at 1037-38.
108. Id. at 1038.
109. New Jersey adopted the UPA (1973) in 1983. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2002).
110. Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1038 (quoting the plaintiffs' brief). The couple also argued that if
the parentage statute did not apply to a lesbian couple in a domestic partnership, then it violated
their equal protection rights under the New Jersey constitution. Id.
111. Id. at 1041.
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born within the circumstances that the Al statute requires1 2 and
granted the nonbiological parent legal parentage." 3
Similarly, in 2005, the Supreme Court of California held that the
provision of the California parentage statute-which states that a
"man is presumed to be the natural father of a child" if he receives the
child into his home and openly considers the child his own-applies
equally to women.114 In Elisa B. v. Superior Court, Elisa and Emily
were unmarried partners in a committed lesbian relationship who de-
cided to each bear a child through AI and raise the children together
in a two-parent family."15 Elisa was to be the primary breadwinner,
and Emily was to be the stay-at-home mother.116 Sharing a sperm
donor, Elisa gave birth to one child and Emily gave birth to twins." 7
After the couple ended their relationship, Elisa refused to pay finan-
cial support to Emily and the twins.118 The appellate court held that
she had no obligation to pay child support because she was not a par-
ent of the twins within the meaning of the California parentage
statute.119
Despite the statute's inclusion of gender-specific terms, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that Elisa was a parent under the statute and
required her to pay child support.120 The court held that where a
nonbiological parent "actively consented to, and participated in, the
artificial insemination of her partner with the understanding that the
resulting ... children would be raised by [them] as coparents, and they
did act as coparents for a substantial period of time," the presumption
of parenthood applies to the nonbiological parent, regardless of gen-
der.121 The court noted that "[r]ebutting the presumption that Elisa is
the twin's parent would leave them with only one parent and would
deprive them of the support of their second parent," which would go
against the recognized value of "having two parents, rather than one,
112. "As the Artificial Insemination statute requires, we have a child born within the context
of a marriage with two spouses, the alternate insemination having been performed by the neces-
sary medical professional." Id. at 1042.
113. Id.
114. Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660, 664-65 (Cal. 2005) (empha-
sis added).
115. Id. at 663.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 663-64.
119. Id. at 664.
120. Id. at 662.
121. Id. at 669.
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as a source of both emotional and financial support." 22 The court
deemed Elisa a parent under the California parentage statute.123
In Shineovich v. Shineovich, an Oregon appellate court held that
that state's marriage-based Al provision was unconstitutional because
it denied parentage based on sexual orientation.124 The statute at is-
sue read,
The relationship, rights and obligation between a child born as a
result of artificial insemination and the mother's husband shall be
the same to all legal intents and purposes as if the child had been
naturally and legitimately conceived by the mother and the
mother's husband if the husband consented to the performance of
artificial insemination.125
The court concluded that "[t]here appears to be no reason for permit-
ting heterosexual couples to bypass adoption proceedings by conceiv-
ing a child through mutually consensual artificial insemination, but
not permitting same-sex couples to do so."126 Therefore, the court
extended the statute "so that it applies when the same-sex partner of
the biological mother consented to the artificial insemination."12 7
There is also a possible emerging trend in state legislatures of pass-
ing new parentage statutes that use gender-neutral language. In 2009,
the District of Columbia passed a law conferring the status of legal
parent to any nonbiological parent who intends to be a parent to a
child born through AI. 28 Using gender-neutral language, the new law
states that a person who consents to a woman's insemination with the
intent to be a parent of the resulting child is the parent of the child.129
The law also states that "[c]onsent by a woman, and a person who
intends to be a parent of a child born to the woman by artificial insem-
ination, shall be in writing signed by the woman and the intended par-
122. Id.
123. Id. at 670.
We conclude, therefore, that Elisa is a presumed mother of the twins under section
7611, subdivision (d), because she received the children into her home and openly held
them out as her natural children, and that this is not an appropriate action in which to
rebut the presumption that Elisa is the twins' parent with proof that she is not the
children's biological mother because she actively participated in causing the children to
be conceived with the understanding that she would raise the children as her own to-
gether with the birth mother, she voluntarily accepted the rights and obligations of
parenthood after the children were born, and there are no competing claims to her
being the children's second parent.
Id.
124. Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 39-40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
125. OR. REv. STAT. § 109.243 (2003) (emphasis added).
126. Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 40.
127. Id.
128. D.C. CODE ANr. § 16-909 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
129. D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1) (2008).
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ent."130 The law went into effect on July 18, 2009,131 and is both
marital-status neutral and gender neutral.132 In the District of Colum-
bia, parentage stems entirely from the intent of the parties as demon-
strated through their written consent or behavior. 33 New Mexico
made a similar revision to the state parentage law, which became ef-
fective on January 1, 2010.134
As discussed above, some courts have recently begun to apply a
gender-neutral interpretation of parentage statutes to enforce child
support or grant legal parentage. 35 These courts have relied on the
public policies of the "best interests of the children" and the value of
having two parents to ignore gender-specific language in the parent-
age statutes.136 Furthermore, at least two state legislatures have
passed new parentage statutes that use gender-neutral language. 3 7
While there could be a gender-neutral trend emerging, the majority of
states with parentage statutes still use gender-specific language and
interpretation.
B. Common Law Doctrines
In many states, lesbian and transgender nonbiological parents are
without statutory recourse to preserve their parental rights.138 Many
courts deny these parents standing to bring claims for parental rights
because state parentage statutes do not explicitly cover lesbian or
transgender families.'39 Some nonbiological parents ask the courts to
apply "a variety of legal theories" to grant them standing to petition
for their parental rights. 40 Two frequently used common law doc-
trines are de facto parenthood and in loco parentis.141 However,
130. D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
131. 2009 D.C. Laws 18-33.
132. Id.
133. See D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(1)(A)-(B).
134. "A person who provides eggs, sperm or embryos for or consents to assisted reproduction
as provided in ... the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act with the intent to be the parent of a
child is a parent of the resulting child." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (Supp. 2010).
135. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005); In
re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1042 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005).
136. Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1042.
137. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-909; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703.
138. See supra notes 43-102 and accompanying text.
139. See Margaret S. Osborne, Note, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate Parentage
for Lesbian Co-Parents, 49 VILL. L. REV. 363, 376 (2004).
140. Id. at 377.
141. While courts have used other common law doctrines, these two are the most common.
See Durkin, supra note 19, at 334-36. The doctrine of equitable parenthood is sometimes ap-
plied to heterosexual nonbiological parents' parental-rights claims. Id. at 336. Equitable
parenthood recognizes a husband who is not the biological father of a child born to his wife
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courts apply vastly different standards for the use of these doctrines,
and consequently, nonbiological parents experience vastly different
results by jurisdiction.
1. De Facto Parenthood
The term "de facto parent" means "parent in fact" and is used to
describe a person, with no biological relation to a child, who claims
parental rights to that child based on a psychological and functional
parent-child relationship.142 According to the American Law Insti-
tute, a de facto parent must have formed a parent-child relationship
with the consent of the legal parent and "regularly performed a share
of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with
whom the child primarily lived."14 3 If an individual is granted de facto
parent status, she has standing to bring custody and visitation claims
in a legal proceeding.144 According to the New Jersey Supreme Court,
"At the heart of the [de facto] parent cases is a recognition that chil-
dren have a strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them
to adults who love and provide for them."145
In 1995, the Wisconsin Supreme Court set forth criteria that demon-
strate the existence of a psychological parent/de facto parent
relationship:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fos-
tered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like
relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived
during their marriage as the natural father if he meets a certain set of criteria. Id. Under the
equitable parenthood doctrine, a nonbiological parent may "acquire the rights of [parenthood]"
as an equitable parent if
(1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father and child,
or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a relationship
over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the husband
desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the husband is willing to take on
the responsibility of paying child support.
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.w.2d 516, 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
If an individual obtains the status of equitable parent, he or she is a legal parent to the child
and the courts will consider the child to have two legal parents when making custody and visita-
tion determinations. See Polikoff, supra note 5, at 501. Courts have been hesitant to extend the
equitable parenthood doctrine to lesbian or transgender nonbiological parents. Durkin, supra
note 19, at 336. Because equitable parenthood is currently only used by heterosexual couples,
this Comment will not discuss it further.
142. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 84 (Md. 2008).
143. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALY-
SIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 203(1)(c) (2002). The definition also notes that the individual
must have lived with the child for at least two years and must have performed the caretaking
functions for reasons other than financial compensation. Id.
144. See Sella, supra note 32, at 155.
145. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550 (N.J. 2000).
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together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner assumed ob-
ligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the
child's care, education and development, including contributing to-
wards the child's support, without expectation of financial compen-
sation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a
length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded,
dependent relationship parental in nature.146
Some state courts use the Wisconsin criteria to determine de facto
parentage. 147 Other state legislatures have codified similar criteria for
the determination of de facto parentage.148 At least one state only
recognizes de facto parenthood when the parent is the primary
caregiver to the child 49 and has parented the child without the biolog-
ical parent.' 50 At least four states have recognized the application of
the de facto parent doctrine to lesbian or transgender nonbiological
parents.15
If a nonbiological parent establishes de facto parenthood, courts
may treat him or her as a parent equal to the biological parent.152 In
V.C. v. M.J.B., the Supreme Court of New Jersey used the de facto
parent doctrine 53 to grant a lesbian nonbiological parent standing and
146. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (footnotes omitted).
147. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005); V.C., 748 A.2d at 551.
148. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2009). In Delaware, a de facto parent
(1) [h]as had the support and consent of the child's parent or parents who fostered the
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the child and the de
facto parent; (2) [hias exercised parental responsibility for the child . .. ; and (3) [h]as
acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded and
dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature.
Id.
149. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010):
"[Die facto custodian" means a person who has been shown by clear and convincing
evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who
has resided with the person for a period of six (6) months or more if the child is under
three (3) years of age and for a period of one (1) year or more if the child is three (3)
years of age or older or has been placed by the Department for Community Based
Services.
150. Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Ky. 2010) ("It has been held that parenting
the child alongside the natural parent does not meet the de facto custodian standard in KRS
403.270(1)(a). .. . Rather, the nonparent must 'literally stand in the place of the natural par-
ent.'" (citations omitted)).
151. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (holding that a lesbian nonbio-
logical parent may be found to be a de facto parent of a child); V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539,
551-53 (N.J. 2000) (holding that a lesbian nonbiological parent may be found to be a de facto
parent of a child); L.B., 122 P.3d at 177 (holding that a de facto parent stands in legal parity with
an otherwise legal parent, whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise); H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at
421 (holding that a lesbian nonbiological parent can be found to be a psychological parent of a
child).
152. See Rohlf, supra note 20, at 700.
153. Although the New Jersey parentage statute includes a section on Al based on the UPA
(1973), the nonbiological parent in V.C did not attempt to use the statute. 748 A.2d at 550.
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subsequent visitation rights to twins conceived by her ex-partner
through AI.15 4 After ending the relationship, the biological parent re-
fused to allow her ex-partner visitation with the children conceived
through Al during their relationship.15 5 In arguing that the nonbio-
logical parent had no standing to petition for custody or visitation, the
biological parent claimed the nonbiological parent was more of a
"helper" than a co-parent.156 The nonbiological parent, however, ar-
gued that because the couple made the decision to have children to-
gether, prepared for birth together, opened savings accounts for the
children together, and functioned as a family unit, she was a co-parent
to the children. 57 The court applied the Wisconsin de facto
parenthood criteria and held that the nonbiological parent was a de
facto parent of the children. 58 The court found that the biological
parent had ceded over a measure of parental authority and autonomy
to the nonbiological parent and that the nonbiological parent had a
strong parent-child bond with the children. 59 Therefore, a de facto
parent-child relationship was "voluntarily created by the legally rec-
ognized parent" and "may not be unilaterally terminated after the re-
lationship between the adults end[ed]."16 0
Among courts that recognize the de facto parenthood doctrine,
some will only afford a de facto parent partial parental status or rights.
In Kazmierazak v. Query, a Florida appellate court held that while a
court may apply a de facto parenthood doctrine to grant custody or
visitation to a nonbiological parent, the doctrine does not give a de
facto parent rights that are equivalent to a biological parent. 161 In-
However, in Robinson, the New Jersey Superior Court granted a petition for a pre-birth order
establishing the legal parentage of a lesbian nonbiological parent under the artificial insemina-
tion section of the parentage statute. 890 A.2d at 1042.
154. V.C., 748 A.2d at 555. The court stated that the biological and nonbiological parents
were "essentially equal," but only granted visitation rights because the nonbiological parent did
not seek joint physical custody. Id. She did seek joint legal custody for decision making, but the
court held that to interject her as a decision maker after four years of separation from that role
would "be unnecessarily disruptive for all involved." Id.
155. Id. at 544.
156. Id. at 543.
157. Id. at 542.
158. Id. at 555.
159. Id. at 552. The court noted that while a legal parent has the "absolute ability to maintain
a zone of autonomous privacy for herself and her child," she "cannot invite a third party to
function as a parent to her child" and expect to maintain the zone of privacy. Id.
160. Id.
161. Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); see also Nancy S. v.
Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the nonbiological parent in
a lesbian couple might be entitled to status as a de facto parent, but this status does not necessa-
rily entitle her to "the same rights as a parent to seek custody and visitation over the objection of
the children's natural mother").
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stead, the biological parent has superior rights to the nonbiological
parent, except when the biological parent's custody would be detri-
mental to the child. 6 2
Other courts will only grant visitation rights under the de facto par-
entage doctrine to parents and grandparents. 63 In Music v. Rachford,
another Florida appellate court dismissed a lesbian nonbiological par-
ent's claim that she was a de facto parent to the child her former part-
ner conceived through AI. 64 When the couple ended their
relationship, the biological parent prohibited the nonbiological parent
from seeing the child.165 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of
the nonbiological parent's complaint, holding that although the nonbi-
ological parent helped make the decision to conceive the child, was
present during the birth of the child, and helped raise the child, the
court had no authority to grant visitation rights to a party who is
neither a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent. 166
Finally, other state courts refuse to recognize claims under the de
facto parenthood doctrine at all.16 7 In Jones v. Barlow, a lesbian
couple entered into a civil union 68 and decided to have a child to-
162. Kazmierazak, 736 So. 2d at 108.
163. See, e.g., Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per
curium).
164. Id. at 1234-35.
165. Id.
166. Id. The court stated that "'[v]isitation rights are, with regard to a non-parent, statutory,
and the court has no inherent authority to award visitation."' Id. (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Meeks v. Garner, 598 So. 2d 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
167. See, e.g., In re Matter of Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(holding that Illinois statutory law supersedes the common law doctrines of de facto parentage
and in loco parentis, and any petition for parental rights must be brought under the relevant
Illinois statutes); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 74 (Md. 2008) (holding that Maryland
law does not recognize de facto parenthood); Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y.
1991) (holding that because the legislature did not recognize de facto parentage, a lesbian nonbi-
ological parent could not use the doctrine to attempt to assert parental rights); In re Thompson,
11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a nonparent who is not and has not been
married to either of the children's parents does not have a statutory, common law, or constitu-
tional right to visitation as a de facto parent); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 685 (Vt. 1997)
(finding that there is no history in Vermont of interfering with the rights and responsibilities of
fit parents absent statutory authority, and declining to do so through the de facto parent doctrine
or the in loco parentis doctrine); Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 499 (Va. Ct. App. 2008)
(finding that no appellate court in Virginia ever applied the de facto parent doctrine and declin-
ing to do so).
168. Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 810 (Utah 2007). In 2006, the Vermont Supreme Court
took a different approach to the parentage determination of a nonbiological parent in a civil
union. The court affirmed a family court's grant of parental status to a nonbiological parent in a
civil union with the biological parent, relying on the intent of the parties to raise the child to-
gether and the joint participation in creating the child through Al. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-
Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 970 (Vt. 2006). The court stated, "[T]he couple's legal union at the time
of the child's birth is extremely persuasive evidence of joint parentage." Id. at 971.
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gether through AI.169 Two years after their daughter was born, the
couple decided to end their relationship.170 The nonbiological parent
brought suit seeking custody and visitation, claiming she had standing
under the common law doctrine of in loco parentis.171 The Supreme
Court of Utah stated that the nonbiological parent was asking the
court to apply the de facto parentage doctrine and refused to "judi-
cially create visitation rights" by adopting the doctrine.172 While the
court recognized that a nonbiological parent may have a strong rela-
tionship with a child, it refused to "subtract from the legal parent's
right to direct the upbringing of her child" based on "'elusive factual
determinations' as to whether she intended to relinquish those rights
to a third party." 73 Although the court stated that there were princi-
pled arguments for adopting a de facto parent doctrine, it noted that
these reasons were policy based and that making social policy is a job
for the legislature.'74
2. Standing In Loco Parentis
In loco parentis is the legal status of a person who assumes parental
responsibilities but is neither the biological nor legal parent of a
child.175 In loco parentis "literally means 'in the place of a parent,'
and refers to a party '[a]cting as a temporary guardian of a child."1 76
The in loco parentis doctrine is most frequently used to grant visita-
tion rights to a stepparent after a dissolution of the stepfamily.177
However, some courts have extended the doctrine to grant visitation
rights to same-sex nonbiological parents after the termination of the
same-sex relationship. 78 To stand in loco parentis to a child, a nonbi-
ological parent must (1) assume the status of the parent and (2) dis-
charge parental duties.179 Unlike the de facto parent doctrine, the in
loco parentis doctrine does not require an individual to function as a
169. Jones, 154 P.3d at 810.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 815. The court also refused to apply the in loco parentis doctrine because the
termination of the in loco parentis relationship also terminates the corresponding parent-like
rights and responsibilities. Id. at 812.
173. Id. at 816 (quoting Van v. Zahorik, 575 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)).
174. Id. at 817.
175. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. 2001).
176. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 84 n.8 (Md. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting
BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 791 (7th ed. 1999)).
177. See Sella, supra note 32, at 156.
178. See, e.g., T.B., 786 A.2d at 914.
179. Id. at 916-17.
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child's psychological parent.s 0 Instead, it only requires that the indi-
vidual assume functional parental duties.181 If an individual obtains in
loco parentis standing to a child, a court may grant her limited paren-
tal rights to that child.182
Applications of the in loco parentis doctrine to nonbiological par-
ents of children conceived through AI vary greatly by jurisdiction.
Some states recognize the application of the in loco parentis doctrine
to lesbian or transgender nonbiological parents' custody or visitation
rights.183 In T.B. v. L.R.M., the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that a lesbian partner who established that she assumed a parental
status and completed parental duties with the consent of the biological
parent had standing in loco parentis to bring action for partial cus-
tody.184 In arguing against the nonbiological parent's standing, the bi-
ological parent noted that under Pennsylvania case law, same-sex
marriage and adoption by a parent's same-sex partner was prohib-
ited. 85 She argued that because the nonbiological parent could never
legally adopt the child, she could not "assume the obligations of a
'lawful parent."1 86 However, the court held that the "ability to marry
the biological parent and the ability to adopt the subject child have
never been and are not now factors in determining whether the third
party assumed a parental status and discharged parental duties."187
The biological parent consented to and facilitated the nonbiological
parent's parental relationship with the child, and the nonbiological
parent assumed a parental status. 8 Therefore, the court found that
the nonbiological parent stood in loco parentis to the child and had
standing to seek partial custody for purposes of visitation. 189
Other courts have only applied the in loco parentis doctrine within
the context of a marriage. In 1999, a Florida appellate court ad-
180. Sella, supra note 32, at 156.
181. Id.
182. See Durkin, supra note 19, at 335 (stating that courts often limit "the rights of a party
standing in loco parentis to the right to intervene on behalf of the child rather than the right to
sue for sole or joint custody").
183. See, e.g., In re Parentage of A.B., 837 N.E.2d 965, 967 (Ind. 2005) (holding that Indiana
courts have the authority to determine whether a nonbiological parent has the rights and obliga-
tions of a parent, and to protect the "social, psychological, cultural, and biological considerations
that significantly benefit the child"); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. 1996) (holding
that a lesbian nonbiological parent had standing in loco parentis to bring action for partial
custody).
184. TB., 786 A.2d at 914.
185. Id. at 918.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 918-19.
188. Id. at 919.
189. Id. at 920.
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dressed the in loco parentis doctrine as it applied to a lesbian nonbio-
logical parent. 190 In Kazmierazak v. Query, the nonbiological parent
claimed that she stood in loco parentis to the child conceived by her
ex-partner, and thus she should be granted parental rights to the
child.191 The court held that although the Florida courts applied the in
loco parentis doctrine to find that a nonbiological parent has an obli-
gation of support, the doctrine applies "only in the context of a mari-
tal relationship."19 2 Because the nonbiological parent and biological
parent in this case were not married, the court held that the doctrine
was inapplicable.19 3
Other courts have held that a nonbiological parent can only stand in
loco parentis to a child when the nonbiological parent and child are
currently living together.194 In White v. White, the nonbiological par-
ent, Leslea, argued that she had standing to bring action based on her
in loco parentis relationship to her nonbiological child because she
and the biological parent, Michelle, "jointly raised the children with
each other's consent, and treated each child, and held each child out
to the world, as the children of both of them."s95 Although Leslea
was no longer living with the child, she claimed that she stood in loco
parentis to the child.196 The Missouri appellate court interpreted the
in loco parentis doctrine to follow the same rules as the stepparent
parental rights statute in Missouri, which states that "a stepparent
shall support his or her stepchild ... so long as the stepchild is living in
the same home as the stepparent."197 Therefore, the court held that
even if Leslea stood in loco parentis to the child while the couple lived
together, "that status terminated when they separated." 98
Finally, some courts have refused to adopt the in loco parentis doc-
trine at all.199 In In re Visitation with C.B.L., an Illinois appellate
190. Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
191. Id. at 109.
192. Id. at 110.
193. Id.
194. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); see also Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d
808, 815 (Utah 2007) ("While Jones may have stood in loco parentis to the child during the time
she was actually living with her and providing for her care, her in loco parentis status terminated
when Barlow and the child moved out. According to common law principles, Jones does not
have standing to extend the in loco parentis relationship against Barlow's wishes.").
195. White, 293 S.W.3d at 15.
196. Id. at 6-7.
197. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.400 (2000).
198. White, 293 S.W.3d at 16.
199. See, e.g., In re Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding
that Illinois statutory law supersedes the common law doctrines of de facto parentage and in loco
parentis and any petition for parental rights must be brought under the relevant Illinois statutes);
Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 685 (Vt. 1992) (finding that there was no history in Vermont
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court held that a lesbian nonbiological parent could not assert stand-
ing to petition for visitation under the common law doctrine of in loco
parentis or de facto parentage. 200 The nonbiological parent was in a
long-term lesbian relationship with the biological parent, and the child
was conceived via Al and born during their relationship. 201 For the
first year and a half of the child's life, the couple raised the child to-
gether as a family.202 After the couple ended their relationship, the
biological parent cut off all communication between the child and the
nonbiological parent.203 The nonbiological parent claimed that she
had standing to petition for visitation of the child under the common
law doctrines of de facto parentage and in loco parentis.204 The court,
however, held that the Marriage Act superseded the common law visi-
tation doctrines in Illinois and that any standing must be found within
the specific provisions of that Act. 2 0 5 Because the nonbiological par-
ent conceded that she did not have standing under the Act, the court
affirmed the dismissal of her petition.206
C. Second-Parent Adoption
While this Comment focuses on the current means for lesbian and
transgender nonbiological parents to assert their parental rights after
the deterioration of a relationship, it is worth noting that lesbian or
transgender nonbiological parents may attempt to sidestep the issues
associated with statutory or common law remedies through second-
parent adoption. 207 In a second-parent adoption, "a child born to one
partner is adopted by his or her nonbiological or non-legal second par-
ent, with the consent of the legal parent, and without changing the
latter's rights and responsibilities." 2 0 8 If the nonbiological parent can
adopt the child as a second parent she "stands in parity with the bio-
of interfering with the rights and responsibilities of fit parents absent statutory authority, and
declining to do so through the de facto parent doctrine or the in loco parentis doctrine).
200. CB.L., 723 N.E.2d at 321.
201. Id. at 317.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 318.
205. Id. at 321.
206. Id. at 320-21.
207. Ralph Ranalli, A Victory For Gay Mothers, But This Case Called Unique, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 11, 2000, at B1 ("Most lesbian couples who have children through artificial insemi-
nation must go through the process of having the non-birth parent legally adopt the child in
order to be granted joint custody.").
208. Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples in a Brave New
World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 5 (1999).
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logical parent and has all the rights and responsibilities that flow from
legal parenthood." 2 0 9
However, as with the parentage statutes, case law, and common law
doctrines, the adoption statutes and case law vary widely by state.
While a few states explicitly allow second-parent adoption in their
statutes210 or case law,211 one state's statutes still explicitly prohibit
same-sex partners from adopting children.212 Other states limit sec-
ond-parent adoption by allowing the sexual orientation of prospective
parents to be considered in adoption proceedings, 213 or effectively
prohibit second-parent adoption by either requiring the biological
parent to relinquish all parental rights before adoption may take
place214 or limiting second-parent adoption to stepparents or
spouses.215
The UPA (1973) and the UPA (2000) were created to fill a gap in
parentage law for children conceived through Al. Although the Con-
ference intended these model acts to create a uniform parentage law
across the country, an examination of state statutes illustrates that
parentage laws vary widely across jurisdictions. Furthermore, com-
mon law doctrine applications vary greatly by jurisdiction. Therefore,
a lesbian or transgender nonbiological parent who is claiming parent-
age of a child conceived through Al will succeed or fail depending on
her state of residence.
209. See Osborne, supra note 139, at 369 (citing Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship
Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 643, 660 (2002)).
210. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
38nn (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) (repealed 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2009).
211. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. 1993) (holding that a
same-sex partner may adopt the child of a legal co-parent in Massachusetts); In re Adoption of
R.B.F. & R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199, 1202 (Pa. 2002) (holding that although the Pennsylvania
statute required that legal parents give up their parental rights in a second-parent adoption,
except in the case of stepparent adoptions, the statute also gave the courts discretion to permit
adoptions in the best interests of the children when not all of the statutory requirements were
met).
212. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2005) (repealed 2010). The statute states, "No person
eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual." Id.
213. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-726a (West 2004).
214. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Kassandra B., 540 N.W.2d 554, 559 (Neb. 1995); In re Angel
Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Wis. 1994). "States with statutes of this type tend to construe
them to mean that in order for the natural parent's same-sex partner to adopt the child, the legal
parent has to relinquish his or her parental rights, which is obviously not the result that same-sex
couples desire." Laura L. Williams, Note, The Unheard Victims of the Refusal to Legalize Same-
Sex Marriage: The Reluctance to Recognize Same-Sex Partners as Parents Instead of Strangers, 9
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 419, 430-31 (2005).
215. Williams, supra note 214, at 430-31.
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III. ANALYSIS
When a lesbian or transgender couple terminates its relationship,
the biological parent may attempt to terminate the nonbiological par-
ent's relationship with the child.216 The nonbiological parent has no
other choice but to turn to a legal system that currently applies varied
principles of law, often with inequitable outcomes for lesbian and
transgender families.217 With diverse statutes, common law doctrine,
and applications across jurisdictions, there is a need for a new, uni-
form approach to parentage determinations for nonbiological parents.
Section A of this Part illustrates the current system's weaknesses in
determining the parentage of nonbiological parents whose ex-partners
have conceived children through AI.218 Section B of this Part pro-
poses a uniform, equitable solution in the law of contracts that re-
spects both the best interest of the child and the couple's autonomous
decision to parent the child together.219 Section C of this Part notes
the current arguments against using contract principles in a family law
context. 220 Section D of this Part establishes that it is legally appropri-
ate to enforce pre-insemination agreements granting legal parentage
to a nonbiological parent.221
A. Weaknesses in Current Approaches
Courts often reject the lesbian or transgender nonbiological par-
ent's claim of parental rights under the relevant state statute or theo-
ries of common law.2 2 2 This "not only disadvantage[s] the non-legal
co-parent, but also risk[s] harm to the child by denying the child the
stability of a continuing relationship with both of her [parents] with-
out any justification related to the quality of the non-legal co-parent's
performance of her parental duties." 223 This outcome disregards both
the best interest of the children and the parents' autonomous decision
to co-parent the children. In addition, the current system leads to
gross inconsistencies between states and inequitable outcomes for les-
216. See Crary, supra note 4.
217. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 348; Williams, supra note 214, at 426.
218. See infra notes 222-65 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 266-313 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 314-28 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 329-49 and accompanying text.
222. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 344-45; see also Crary, supra note 4.
223. E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the "Creatures of the State:" Contracting for Child Custody
Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1149 (2000).
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bian and transgender families.224 Therefore, there is "a growing need
for clear standards determining parentage for [these] couples." 225
1. The Current System Is Not Uniform Across Jurisdictions
State parentage statutes vary widely across the United States.
While some states have adopted the UPA (1973), others adopted the
UPA (2000), and still others adopted neither. Furthermore, of those
that have adopted a version of the UPA, some modified it before
adoption. The different statutes lead to different results across juris-
dictions for lesbian and transgender nonbiological parents and their
children. Courts also vary in whether they strictly interpret gender-
specific language or marriage-specific language in their statutes to ex-
clude lesbian, transgender, or unmarried couples.
The application of common law doctrines to grant legal parentage
also varies by state. Some courts allow the use of common law princi-
ples, such as de facto parentage and in loco parentis, when there is no
available statutory recourse. Other courts have held that any standing
for parental or visitation rights must be found solely within the parent-
age statutes. Yet even when the courts apply common law doctrines
to parentage determinations, some courts only apply common law
doctrine within the context of a marriage or cohabitation.
As the Conference recognized when drafting both the UPA (1973)
and the UPA (2000), there is a need for consistency in the law across
jurisdictions.226 Yet the various statutory and common law ap-
proaches result in vastly different outcomes for similarly situated
nonbiological parents seeking custody or visitation of a child con-
ceived through Al. For example, while a lesbian nonbiological parent
who signed a pre-insemination agreement to co-parent a child may be
granted parental status in California, 227 she would likely be denied
parentage in Missouri228 under the same facts.229 Because heterosex-
ual, lesbian, and transgender couples "are increasingly choosing to
conceive by artificial insemination," there is a growing need for pre-
224. See Polikoff, supra note 5, at 483 (noting that there are "gross inconsistencies across state
lines [and] inconsistencies within states" in how courts apply these doctrines).
225. Nilsson, supra note 43, at 483 (citing Jacobs, supra note 4, at 342).
226. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr prefatory note, at 1 (2000) (revised 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE
Acr prefatory note, at 1 (1973).
227. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660, 664 (Cal. 2005).
228. See, e.g., White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
229. Although both of these states adopted the UPA (1973), Missouri courts have refused to
apply the Al section protections to a lesbian nonbiological parent, while California courts have
held that the Al section applies equally to a lesbian nonbiological parent. See supra notes
227-28 and accompanying text.
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dictable law and precedent on which all nonbiological parents can rely
to establish parentage. 230 Although there may be a small but increas-
ing trend of gender-neutral statutes or interpretation, "realistically,
legislatures nationwide are not likely to undertake statutory reform of
the laws regarding parenthood." 2 31
2. The Current System Yields Inequitable Results for Lesbian and
Transgender Families
While many state parentage statutes grant parental status to mar-
ried or male nonbiological parents of children born via AI, the vast
majority of them do not explicitly grant parentage to lesbian or trans-
gender232 nonbiological parents.233 Courts have consistently refused
to apply a gender-neutral interpretation to state parentage statutes.
In In re Marriage of Simmons, an Illinois appellate court held that
while the parties were married and signed a pre-insemination agree-
ment to co-parent the child, the Al section of the Illinois Parentage
Act 234 does not apply to a transsexual nonbiological parent who has
not completed sex reassignment surgery. 235 Because the transsexual
nonbiological parent was not legally male, the couple's marriage was
an invalid same-sex marriage.236 The court noted that the Illinois leg-
islature meant the parentage statute to "apply to 'husbands' and
'wives' as those terms are ordinarily and popularly understood,"
which did not include transsexuals who are in the process of becoming
male.2 3 7 Had the nonbiological parent been born a male, or had he
completed his sexual reassignment surgery by the time of the legal
proceedings, the court would have likely determined he was a legal
parent to his nonbiological child under the Al section of the Illinois
230. Meghan Anderson, Note, K.M. v. E.G.: Blurring the Lines of Parentage in the Modern
Courts, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 275, 305 (2006).
231. See Sella, supra note 32, at 161.
232. See In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 308-09, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (refusing
to grant parental rights to a transsexual nonbiological parent who had not completed his sex
reassignment surgery because he was not considered male under the law).
233. See supra notes 43-102 and accompanying text.
234. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(a) (2008).
235. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309-11.
236. Id. at 309.
237. Id. at 311.
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Parentage Act.2 3 8 Instead, the court treated the couple's marriage as
invalid and refused to grant parentage to the nonbiological parent.239
As noted by one court, "'no [legitimate] reason exists to provide
the children born to lesbian parents through the use of reproductive
technology with less security and protection than that given to chil-
dren born to heterosexual parents through artificial insemination." 240
The court went on to state that while the current statutory framework
does not explicitly accommodate lesbian families in this situation, "we
cannot close our eyes to the legal and social needs of our society. "241
Courts should apply the same law and principles in Al parentage cases
regardless of the gender or sexual orientation of the nonbiological
parent.
3. The Current System Disregards the Parties' Autonomous
Decisions to Create Families
Generally, a couple that chooses to use Al to conceive a child has
made a thoughtful, informed decision to bear that child.2 4 2 They have
invested significant financial resources into conception and have dis-
cussed co-parenting the child.2 43 As one commentator noted,
238. The court noted in Simmons that the Al agreement was invalid regardless of the same-
sex marriage because the physician who performed the procedure did not certify the signatures
and date of the insemination on the consent agreement. 825 N.E.2d at 311. However, had the
nonbiological parent been legally male, he would have retained his right to parentage under the
presumption of parenthood in the Illinois Parentage Statute. Id. at 312. The court quoted the
Illinois Parentage Act:
Section 5 of the Parentage Act . . . states in relevant part:
"(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other, even
though the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born or conceived
during such marriage;
(2) after the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have married each other,
even though the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and he is named, with his
written consent, as the child's father on the child birth certificate[.]"
Id. at 311 (alteration in original). However, the court held that this presumption of parenthood
did not apply to the transsexual nonbiological parent because it "confers a presumption on a
'man' to be the natural father of a child" and "is based on the premise that the parties who are
involved are a man and a woman." Id. at 312.
239. Id. at 315.
240. In re Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (alteration in original)
(quoting the appellant's brief), vacated by King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965, 966 (Ind. 2005).
241. Id.
242. Harvey L. Fiser & Paula K. Garrett, It Takes Three, Baby: The Lack of Standard, Legal
Definitions of "Best Interest of the Child" and the Right to Contract for Lesbian Potential Parents,
15 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 1, 27 (2008) (citing Michael Hopkins, "What Is Sauce for the
Gander Is Sauce for the Goose:" Enforcing Child Support on Former Same-Sex Partners Who
Create a Child Through Artificial Insemination, 25 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 219, 220 (2006)).
243. See id.
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"[W]hen one is artificially inseminated ... one acts directly and unam-
biguously to achieve procreation." 244 Despite the existence of an in-
formed, autonomous decision to parent between two parties, courts
have used gender-specific or marital status-specific language in par-
entage statutes to effectively terminate longstanding parent-child re-
lationships in lesbian or transgender families.2 4 5  Courts have also
refused to grant lesbian or transgender nonbiological parents their pa-
rental rights under the various equitable common law doctrines dis-
cussed in the previous Part.2 4 6
Judicial refusal to grant parental rights to nonbiological parents who
helped make the decision to conceive children, intended to raise the
children in a family unit with the biological parents, and fulfilled pa-
rental responsibilities since the children's birth, ignores the parties'
autonomous intentions to create a family.247 As a New Jersey court
noted when granting parentage to a nonbiological lesbian parent, the
couple had "availed themselves of every legal opportunity open to
them to declare they are committed domestic partners, a married
couple and a dedicated family." 248 In other words, their intent to cre-
ate a family together as co-parents was clear. The court also noted
that the Al section of the state parentage statute makes clear that
parentage determinations are based on intent.2 4 9
Courts should not disregard a couple's autonomous decision to cre-
ate a family by terminating a healthy parent-child relationship. The
nonbiological parent should not be denied her parental rights when
she and her partner made the mutual decision to become parents to-
gether, simply because she is not biologically tied to the child.250
244. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 310.
245. See supra notes 43-102 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 138-206 and accompanying text.
247. See Rachel E. Shoaf, Note, Two Mothers and Their Child: A Look at the Uncertain Status
of Nonbiological Lesbian Mothers Under Contemporary Law, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
267, 293 (2005) (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11-12 (1967)) ("The United States Supreme Court has firmly held that, in family life, individuals
should be allowed to direct their families' own destinies and that prejudice is not a valid reason
for disallowing that autonomy.").
248. In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1041 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
249. Id. at 1042. "The designation of parent at birth is not limited by the strict definition of
paternity. Rather, the individual seeking equal treatment under the Artificial Insemination stat-
ute must show indicia of commitment to be a spouse and to be a parent to the child." Id.
250. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005):
Elisa is a presumed mother of the twins . .. because she received the children into her
home and openly held them out as her natural children, and that this is not an appropri-
ate action in which to rebut the presumption that Elisa is the twins' parent with proof
that she is not the children's biological mother because she actively participated in
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Some lesbian or transgender couples go so far as to create pre-insemi-
nation parentage agreements, in which both parties agree to parent
the resulting child, to settle any future question about legal parent-
age.251 As one commentator notes, "When two competent individuals
enter into a decision to start a family and go through the legal
processes to ensure that both of them will be considered equal parents
to a child under the law, that decision should be binding." 252
4. The Current System Disregards the Best Interests of the Child
Perhaps most importantly, depriving a child of a fit 2 5 3 parent disre-
gards the best interest of that child. The lesbian and transgender
nonbiological parents in the cases discussed above provided physical,
emotional, mental, and financial support to their children, some for
many years.254 If, after the termination of the lesbian or transgender
couple's relationship, the biological parent chooses to prohibit visita-
tion between the nonbiological parent and the child, she is depriving
the child of a longstanding parent-child relationship. 255
The courts consider the best interest of the child to be "paramount
and [it] will, at times, take priority over the interest of parents." 256 It
is in a child's best interest, and it is a "compelling state interest," for a
child to have "two parents, rather than one, as a source of both emo-
tional and financial support, especially when the obligation to support
the child would otherwise fall to the public." 257 As the Supreme
Court of New Jersey stated, "[C]hildren have a strong interest in
causing the children to be conceived with the understanding that she would raise the
children as her own together with the birth mother.
251. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
252. Shoaf, supra note 247, at 293.
253. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Troxel v. Granville,
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will
normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family
to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the
rearing of that parent's children.
530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)).
254. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J. 2000) ("[The nonbiological parent] and
[the biological parent] are essentially equal. Each appears to be a fully capable, loving parent
committed to the safety and welfare of the twins."); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 164
(Wash. 2005) ("[T)he trial judge found that 'there is a substantial relationship between [the
nonbiological parent] and the child in this case' and that 'both parties care deeply' for the
child.").
255. See, e.g., Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669 ("Rebutting the presumption that Elisa is the twin's
parent would leave them with only one parent and would deprive them of the support of their
second parent.").
256. In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1042 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005).
257. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669; see also Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1038.
In Robinson, the New Jersey Superior Court stated,
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maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and provide
for them. That interest, for constitutional as well as social purposes,
lies in the emotional bonds that develop between family members as a
result of shared daily life."258 Another court noted that the Al section
of the state parentage statute "has as its underpinning the interest in
identifying a child's [second] parent for the benefit of the child and,
secondarily, to repose financial responsibility upon that parent rather
than upon the citizenry." 259
If a child has two fit, loving parents, it is beneficial for that child to
maintain relationships with both of those parents, regardless of their
sexual orientation.260 For this reason, courts should extend the best
interest of the child principle to all families, regardless of the sexual
orientation of the parents. An appellate court in Indiana noted,
[The courts'] paramount concern should be with the effect of our
laws on the reality of children's lives. It is not the courts that have
engendered the diverse composition of today's families. It is the
advancement of reproductive technologies and society's recognition
of alternative lifestyles that have produced families in which a bio-
logical, and therefore a legal, connection is no longer the sole or-
ganizing principle. But it is the courts that are required to define,
declare and protect the rights of children raised in those families,
usually upon their dissolution. 261
Yet despite the well-established public policy of the child's best inter-
est taking precedent over other interests, children of lesbian and
transgender parents are often denied the benefit of two fit parents,
which goes against the children's best interests.262
Some courts use common law doctrine to establish the parentage of
lesbian or transgender nonbiological parents in order to serve the best
Arguably, the benefits to a child of having two legal parents are numerous and would
certainly include economic security such as the right to support, the right to inherit by
intestacy... , and the right to inherit free of the fifteen percent New Jersey inheritance
tax. Additionally, the child would be eligible for health insurance as a dependent ...
and would be entitled to insurance and social security benefits in the event of [the
nonbiological parent's] death.
890 A.2d at 1038.
258. V.C., 748 A.2d at 550.
259. Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1042 (emphasis added).
260. The American Psychological Association (APA) publicly supports two-parent gay and
lesbian families. "Research and clinical experience indicate that when children have been raised
from birth or an early age by lesbian couples, co-parent adoption will ordinarily provide signifi-
cant psychological and social benefits to them and therefore will ordinarily be in their best inter-
ests." Brief for the American Psychological Association as Amici Curiae, In re Adoption of
Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002) (No. S-01-0053).
261. In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting In re
Adoption of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993)).
262. See supra notes 43-206 and accompanying text.
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interests of the children.263 As the Supreme Court of Washington
stated, the Washington legislature intended "a strong presumption in
favor of parental involvement, fostering and protecting a child's signif-
icant relationships" when creating the legal visitation system.264 The
"best interest of the child is ordinarily served when the existing pat-
tern of interaction between a parent and child is altered only to the
extent necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents or as
required to protect the child from physical, mental, or emotional
harm."265 As the Washington court noted, cutting ties between a child
and her nonbiological parent, whom she has known to be her parent
all her life, goes directly against her interest in maintaining familial
relationships.
While courts almost always grant legal parent status to heterosexual
nonbiological parents of children conceived through Al through par-
entage statutes or common law doctrine, they often deny legal parent
status to similarly situated lesbian or transgender nonbiological par-
ents. These nonbiological parents then lack standing to seek custody
or visitation with the minor children, despite their intentions and ac-
tions to parent the children. This discrepancy results in a lack of uni-
formity in parentage decisions, is inequitable, ignores the autonomy of
the parties, and disregards the child's best interests. There is a need
for a new approach that can and will be applied to all nonbiological
parents, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity.
B. A Solution in the Law of Contracts
Without reliable statutory or common law recourse, lesbian and
transgender couples may sign pre-insemination contracts to attempt to
"mitigate the effects of uncertain legal consequence of AI."266 These
contracts establish that the sperm donor is not a parent to the result-
ing child.2 6 7 They also establish that the biological parent's partner, or
263. See, e.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 917-18 (Pa. 2001) (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682
A.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)); see also In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 166
(Wash. 2005) ("Washington courts have consistently invoked their equity powers and common
law responsibility to respond to the needs of children and families in the face of changing
realities.").
264. L.B., 122 P.3d at 172.
265. Id. at 173.
266. Fiser & Garrett, supra note 242, at 19.
267. Id. at 20. However, as noted by this Comment, the UPA (2000) provides, "[T]he rights of
a donor are often clearly expressed by legislation, as the 'donor is not a parent of a child con-
ceived by means of assisted reproduction."' Id. (citing UNIw. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000)
(revised 2002)).
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the nonbiological parent, is an equal co-parent to the resulting
child.268
Many state courts hold that the existence of these pre-insemination
agreements, or even an oral agreement, can establish a nonbiological
parent's legal parentage. 269 A grant of legal parentage to a nonbio-
logical parent simultaneously grants parental rights and responsibili-
ties.270 It also grants a child the right to receive various types of
parental support from that nonbiological parent.271 Although some
courts argue that contract principles have no place in parentage deci-
sions,272 courts should reconceive contract principles as applicable to
parentage determinations, especially in the case of assisted reproduc-
tive technology where the intent of the parties plays a key role in the
creation of a family.
Courts should rely on pre-insemination parentage contracts to de-
termine a party's legal parentage, regardless of the nonbiological par-
ent's gender or marital status.273 The future biological and
nonbiological parents-private parties to the contracts-enter into
these agreements in order to illustrate their intentions to parent their
children together.274 The agreements also illustrate the parents' inten-
268. Id. at 20-21.
269. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005)
("As we noted in the context of a husband who consented to the artificial insemination of his
wife using an anonymous sperm donor, but later denied responsibility for the resulting child:
'One who consents to the production of a child cannot create a temporary relation to be as-
sumed and disclaimed at will, but the arrangement must be of such character as to impose an
obligation of supporting those for whose existence he is directly responsible."') citing People v.
Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 499 (Cal. 1968))); In re Parentage of G.E.M., 890 N.E.2d 944, 954 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2008) ("The Act allows that fatherhood is not always created by pure genetics. Con-
sent is as legally binding on a parent as a DNA determination when that unconditional accept-
ance of the role of parent is voluntarily accepted for purposes of an adoption or a voluntary
acceptance of paternity."); L.M.S. v. S.L.S., 312 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) ("We hold
that a husband who, because of his sterile condition, consents to his wife's impregnation, with
the understanding that a child will be created whom they will treat as their own, has the legal
duties and responsibilities of fatherhood, including support.").
270. See, e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights
and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J. L. & FAM. STuD. 309, 314 (2007) ("Legal
parentage entitles a parent to all the rights, responsibilities, privileges, and benefits of parentage.
Lack of parental status often renders other adults as legal strangers without standing or recourse
to establish or maintain a relationship with a child.").
271. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1.1 (2008) ("Illinois recognizes the right of every child
to the physical, mental, emotional and monetary support of his or her parents under this Act.").
272. See, e.g., T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Mass. 2004).
273. See Fiser & Garrett, supra note 242, at 20 ("One strategy for mitigating judicial bias and
clearly establishing intentionality has been a two-step contract to ensure the rights of co-par-
ents. . . . [T]he first step includes terminating the parental rights of the donor, and the second
step involves providing rights to the nonbiological co-parent . . . ." (citing Durkin, supra note 19,
at 342)).
274. Id.
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tion to give the child the benefit of both parents' support. As required
by the UPA (1973), the supervising physician may certify these agree-
ments.275 When a biological parent terminates the child's relationship
with the nonbiological parent, she is breaching the pre-insemination
contract by denying the child his right to the support of his nonbio-
logical parent. As third-party beneficiaries to the agreements, the
children should be able to bring an action against the breaching par-
ties for specific performance of the pre-insemination contracts.
First, before an agreement is "deemed a third party beneficiary con-
tract, it must. .. be deemed a contract." 276 To create a valid contract,
the parties must have objectively intended to contract and there must
have been valid consideration. 277 Without the means to reproduce
their own biological children, lesbian and transgender couples rely on
the principle of intent to establish their families. As noted by several
commentators, "There is a distinct difference between parents of a
child created by accident during heterosexual intercourse and parents
of a child born through Al processes. Most often, a great amount of
thought and often significant financial outlay has occurred in AI
cases." 278 The conscious decision to parent that corresponds with the
process of Al is evidence that the parties intended to create a family
with a binding pre-insemination agreement.
The question becomes whether there was valid consideration for
both parties. To constitute consideration, a performance must be bar-
gained for, or sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and
given by the promisee in exchange for that promise. 279 The perform-
ance itself "may consist of (a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a
forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal
relation." 280 If the contract lacks consideration, it is not a valid and
enforceable contract. 281 The contracting parties, not the third-party
beneficiaries, must supply the requisite consideration. 282
275. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 5(a) (1973) ("The physician shall certify their signatures and
the date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent with the [State Department of
Health], where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file." (alteration in original)).
276. 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 37:23 (4th ed. 2000); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309(1) (1981).
277. See WILLISTON, supra note 276, § 37:23.
278. Fiser & Garrett, supra note 242, at 27 (citing Hopkins, supra note 242, at 220).
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71.
280. Id. § 71(3).
281. See id. § 71.
282. See WILLISTON, supra note 276, § 37:23 ("[Tlhe general rule, adopted by the overwhelm-
ing majority of jurisdictions, is that the plaintiff beneficiary is not required to furnish the consid-
eration. So long as there is consideration for the promisor's undertaking, the promise is
enforceable by the third party beneficiary." (footnote omitted)).
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There is valid consideration between the biological and nonbiologi-
cal parent in a pre-insemination contract. The parties agree to estab-
lish the legal parentage of the nonbiological parent, despite her lack of
a biological connection to the child. 2 8 3 The biological parent promises
to hold her partner as a second, equal parent to the child. The nonbi-
ological parent promises to "assume the duties of parenthood in ex-
change for the coordinate rights." 284
Parental responsibilities go far beyond financial obligations and in-
clude "the obligation to insure the physical, mental, and emotional
well-being of the child." 28 5 The Illinois Supreme Court, for example,
recognized these broader rights and responsibilities under the Illinois
Parentage Act:
[T]he purpose of [the Illinois Parentage Act] is to further the public
policy of Illinois to "recognize[ ] the right of every child to the phys-
ical, mental, emotional and monetary support of his or her parents
under this Act." . . . The provisions of the Parentage Act underscore
that the importance of parentage hinges upon the rights and respon-
sibilities that are attendant to the parent and child relationship. As
such, the Parentage Act defines the term "parent and child relation-
ship" as "the legal relationship existing between a child and his nat-
ural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or
imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations."2 8 6
If a court refuses to recognize the parentage of a nonbiological parent,
she has "no legal authority to make important medical or educational
decisions for [her] children, or to influence religious or moral
decisions. "287
The responsibilities attendant to the creation of a parent-child rela-
tionship, as detailed above, serve as valid consideration for the pre-
insemination contracts. The nonbiological parent is seeking these
rights and in exchange, promising to meet these responsibilities for the
child. Simultaneously, the biological parent is promising to uphold the
nonbiological parent as a legal parent in exchange for the nonbiologi-
cal parent's promise to meet all the responsibilities of parentage, in-
cluding financial responsibilities in case the couple separates.
Therefore, as long as the agreement meets all other requirements to
constitute a valid contract, it is a contract.
283. See, e.g., UNwF. PARENTAGE Acr § 703 (2000) (revised 2002) (allowing such agreements
for a "man" and "woman"); UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 5(a) (1973) (allowing such agreements for
a "husband" and "wife").
284. See Durkin, supra note 19, at 345.
285. In re Parentage of G.E.M., 890 N.E.2d 944, 953 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
286. J.S.A. v. M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 246 (Ill. 2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2 (2008)).
287. See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 347.
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In Illinois, for example, pre-insemination 'agreements are
mandatory contracts for partners in a married couple and their par-
entage statuses.288 As the Illinois Supreme Court held in In re Parent-
age of M.J., "The failure to provide or obtain written consent will
preclude a claim for paternity and child support under the Illinois Par-
entage Act."289 The nonbiological parent must sign a pre-insemina-
tion agreement for each AI procedure completed "under the
supervision of a licensed physician" and "acknowledged by both the
husband and wife." 290
Second, in order to rely on contract law to establish parentage, the
child must show that she is a third-party beneficiary to the contract.
While "'[a]s a general rule, strangers to a contract acquire no rights
under such a contract,"' the doctrine of third-party beneficiary con-
tracts is an established exception. 291 Under this doctrine, "an individ-
ual who is not a party to a contract can enforce the contract" if he is a
beneficiary of the promise. 292 A third person is a beneficiary if "the
promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance." 2 9 3 If the third party is only an incidental beneficiary,
he is not a beneficiary with rights under the contract.294 If the third
party is an intended beneficiary, the promisor has a contract duty to
both the promisee and the third party.295 It must appear from the
facts and circumstances surrounding the contract that it was made for
the direct benefit of the third person.296 Furthermore, "if the benefici-
ary would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an
intention to confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary. "297
In the case of pre-insemination Al agreements, the resulting child is
an intended third-party beneficiary to her parents' contract. One pur-
288. In re Parentage of MJ., 787 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ill. 2003).
289. Id.
290. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3 (2008).
291. See WILLISTON, supra note 276, § 37:1 (quoting N. Nat'1 Bank v. N. Minn. Nat'I Bank, 70
N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. 1955)).
292. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 14 (1981)).
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1)(b). The Restatement (Second) specifi-
cally distinguishes between intended beneficiaries and incidental beneficiaries. Id.
294. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 & cmt. a; 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 10.3 (2d ed. 1998).
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 305. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 294,
§ 10.3; WILLISTON, supra note 276, § 37:1 ("[T]he third party beneficiary doctrine [also] either
dispenses with the need for privity or asserts that privity, by virtue of the party's status as a third
party beneficiary .... ).
296. See WILLISTON, supra note 276, § 37:27. However, "[iut is not essential to the creation of
a right in an intended beneficiary that he be identified when a contract containing the promise is
made." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 308.
297. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. d.
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pose of these contracts is to establish that the biological parent and
her partner will both be equal, legal parents to the child.298 The prom-
ise indicates, or specifies, that they will both provide physical, emo-
tional, and financial support to the child.299 This agreement directly
benefits the child, who receives the support of two parents. Both par-
ents intend to give the child-beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance.300 While the contract might not explicitly state "the re-
sulting child is a direct beneficiary of this agreement," the language of
the contract illustrates that the contract is made with the intention to
benefit the child with two sources of parental support.
Once it is established that the AI contract is valid and enforceable
and that the child is a third-party beneficiary, the child should be able
to bring action for specific performance if one of the parties breaches
the contract.301 Specific performance is a form of equitable relief that
"may be granted after there has been a breach of contract by either
nonperformance or repudiation." 302 An order of specific performance
"is intended to produce as nearly as is practicable the same effect that
the performance due under a contract would have produced."303 It
often orders a party who breached his contract duty to perform a spe-
cific act that was promised in the contract. 304 The order may be di-
rected at the injured party as well, if appropriate to achieve justice.305
A court may also grant relief by ordering an injunction against the
violation of a negative promise.306
Courts grant specific performance of a contract duty at their discre-
tion and generally will only grant equitable relief if damages are inad-
equate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party.307 For
298. See Fiser & Garrett, supra note 242, at 27.
299. See id. at 20.
300. See Shultz, supra note 244, at 351. Shultz states,
Enforcing reproductive and parental agreements would make such commitments bind-
ing at an earlier stage than is now typical. However, the fact that the intentions at issue
here are formed before any child is conceived-that the expectations and reliance in-
clude the very creation of the child itself-suggests that there are strong reasons to
accept an earlier cutoff point.
Id.
301. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 294, § 10.7.
302. Id. § 12.5.
303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a (1981).
304. Id. § 357.
305. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 294, § 12.5.
306. See WILLIsTON, supra note 276, § 67:53.
307. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note
294, § 12.6. According to Williston, there are six factors that may affect the granting or denial of
specific performance:
(1) [Tlhere must be no adequate remedy at law;
(2) there must be a contract sufficiently explicit and certain to warrant enforcement;
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example, damages may be insufficient "because the subject matter of
the contract is so unique or of such a special nature that it resists
translation into quantitative terms" or "because it is impossible to ar-
rive at a legal measure of damages at all, or at least with any sufficient
degree of certainty." 308
As third-party beneficiaries, children conceived through Al should
be entitled to specific performance of pre-insemination contracts. The
biological parent may breach the contract by terminating the child's
relationship with the nonbiological parent when the relationship be-
tween the two parents ends.309 If the biological parent refuses to al-
low the child to have a relationship with the nonbiological parent,
damages are an inappropriate remedy for breach of the pre-insemina-
tion parentage agreement because the loss of a parent's emotional and
mental support cannot be substituted for dollars.310 The only remedy
that can protect a child's interest in maintaining the support of his
nonbiological parent is specific performance. 311
The performance of sharing custody or visitation, or securing the
"performance of promises regarding who will be the parent" are "rel-
atively easy for a court to supervise . . . [because] legal designation of
parental status is directly within the law's control." 312 Therefore, "an
order specifically to perform-together with an order declaring legal
parental status according to the terms of the agreement-may well be
appropriate."3 13 As a third-party beneficiary to the pre-insemination
parentage agreement, the child should be able to bring an action
under the contract to stop the biological parent from denying the par-
(3) the consideration underlying the contract must be adequate and not
disproportionate;
(4) enforcement must not result in undue hardship;
(5) the decree must not be futile, as where performance is impossible; and,
(6) the suit must be timely; that is, the parties seeking enforcement must not be guilty
of laches.
WILLISTON, supra note 276, § 67:62 (footnotes omitted).
308. See WILLISTON, supra note 276, § 67:8.
309. See Sella, supra note 32, at 162-63.
310. Accord id. Sella states,
Ordinarily, in the event of a contract breach, money damages are awarded. Yet, in
the area of a parent-child relationship, a monetary remedy would be inappropriate.
Money would not compensate for the loss of a parent-child relationship nor make the
breached party whole. Thus, should the relationship between the mothers end and a
breach of the parental rights agreement occur, the appropriate remedy would be spe-
cific performance in the form of shared custody or visitation.
Id.
311. Accord id. at 163.
312. Shultz, supra note 244, at 365.
313. Id. at 368.
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entage (and corresponding rights and responsibilities) of the nonbio-
logical parent.
C. Arguments Against Using Contract Principles in Family Law
While some state statutes assert that pre-insemination private con-
tracts between the intended parents shall determine parentage, "en-
forceability remains the problem." 314 First, some biological parents
have argued that nonbiological parents should not be granted parental
status through a pre-insemination contract due to the public policy of
judicial deference to the legal parent.315 Federal and state law both
"give significant deference to legal parents" to make decisions about
the care, custody, and control of their children.316
In Troxel v. Granville, the U.S. Supreme Court further solidified
this public policy when determining whether a child's grandparents
could be granted visitation rights against the wishes of the child's legal
parent.317 The Court stated, "The liberty ... interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children [ ] is perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."318 The
Court recognized that the "Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make deci-
sions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children,"319
and held that so long as the parent is fit, "there will normally be no
reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family
to further question the ability of that parent to make the best deci-
sions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." 320 Therefore,
the Court refused to grant the child's grandparents standing to assert
their visitation rights over the wishes of the legal parent.321 Relying
on Troxel, some courts have held that a contract for custody or visita-
tion rights between a legal parent and a non-legal parent cannot su-
314. Fiser & Garrett, supra note 242, at 22.
315. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) ("[The biological parent]
asserts the recognition of [the nonbiological parent] as a defacto parent .. . violates [the biologi-
cal parent's] constitutionally protected liberty interest to care for and control her child without
unwarranted state intervention . . . .").
316. Jacobs, supra note 4, at 348. Jacobs notes that "[i]n their attempts to seek legal recogni-
tion of their parenthood and to maintain contact with their children, lesbian coparents have been
treated as third parties.... [B]y categorizing lesbian coparents as mere third party petitioners or
'legal strangers,' courts overlook the actual parental relationship that has been established." Id.
at 349-50.
317. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).
318. Id. at 65.
319. Id. at 66.
320. Id. at 68-69.
321. Id. at 73.
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persede the policy of deference to the legal parent.322 This "strong
parental preference in custody cases has hurt the claims of legally un-
recognized parents in planned lesbian and gay families." 3^
Second, courts will often refuse to "enforce provisions concerning
parentage of a child" because they consider it "abhorrent to public
policy" to use contract law in parentage determinations. 324 One court
stated that "the decision to become, or not to become, a parent is a
personal right of 'such delicate and intimate character that direct en-
forcement . . . by any process of the court should never be at-
tempted." 325 Therefore, even if a clear pre-insemination parentage
contract exists, some courts ignore the agreement and rely solely on
the state's parentage statutes or common law doctrine to make a par-
entage determination.326 As one commentator noted, some courts re-
sist applying the impersonal, marketplace rules of contract to the
family.327 Other courts will only enforce a parentage agreement if
they determine that the results are also consistent with the best inter-
est of the child.328
322. See, e.g., Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("Florida law
does not recognize a claim for specific performance of a contract for visitation with an unrelated
third party."); T.F. v. B.L, 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1250-51 (Mass. 2004).
323. Nancy D. Polikoff, The Impact of Troxel v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 825, 855 (2001).
324. Williams, supra note 214, at 428.
325. T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1250-51 (quoting A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (stating
that although "[c]ontracts between unmarried same-sex couples concerning the welfare and sup-
port of a child stand on the same footing as any other agreement between unmarried cohabi-
tants," a contract establishing a person's parental status is unenforceable, and noting that
"'[p]arenthood by contract' is not the law in Massachusetts"). However, a few years prior, the
same court saw "a written coparenting agreement as demonstrative of the biological mother's
consent to and encouragement of the plaintiff's de facto parental relationship with the child, as
well as indicative of the parties' belief regarding the child's best interest; hence, the agreement
could factor into the judge's decision regarding visitation." Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Part-
ners: Strangers, Third Parties, or Parents? The Changing Legal Landscape and the Struggle for
Parental Equality, 40 FAM. L.Q. 23, 41 (2006) (citing E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 n.10
(Mass. 1999)).
326. See, e.g., T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1250-51. As noted by commentators, courts should not use
the "best interest of the child" standard to determine parentage, but to make custody, visitation,
and support determinations after parentage has already been established by the pre-insemina-
tion contract. See, e.g., Fiser & Garrett, supra note 242, at 30.
327. Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law
and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 29 (2004) (citing JANET L. DOGGIN,
DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 180-81
(1997)). Baker also states, however, that "the law was indisputably comfortable with letting
marriage determine paternity. . . . Many children today are conceived by means other than sex-
ual intercourse." Id. at 23. And "[c]ourts ... almost always use contract to identify the chil-
dren's parents." Id. at 26.
328. According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "A promise affecting the right of
custody of a minor child is unenforceable on grounds of public policy, unless the disposition as to
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D. Pre-Insemination Contracts Are an Appropriate Means
to Establish Parentage
Judicial hesitation to apply the principles of contract law is a disser-
vice to both lesbian and transgender nonbiological parents and their
children. Where a pre-insemination agreement establishes parentage
of a nonbiological parent, that agreement is a clear indication that
both parties intended for the nonbiological parent to be a legal parent
to the child.329 The child should have the legal right to enforce that
agreement and continue to receive the love and support of her nonbi-
ological parent that she has enjoyed throughout her life.
It is appropriate to use contract law to establish parentage of all
nonbiological parents, regardless of their gender or marital status.
First, the use of contract principles in a family law context does not
violate the public policy of parental deference espoused in Troxel.
Second, courts already commonly use contract law in the family law
context, with marriage presumptions, surrogacy agreements, and Al
agreements in UPA (1973) or UPA (2000) states.
1. Contract Law Does Not Violate the Public Policy of Parental
Deference
The use of contract principles to grant parentage to a nonbiological
parent does not interfere with the liberty interest established in
Troxel. As some courts have recognized, the lesbian and transgender
nonbiological parents who seek legal parentage in these cases are not
third parties; they are second parents to the children at issue.330 The
parental deference principle established in Troxel is not used to weigh
the competing interests of two parents, but to weigh the interest of a
parent more heavily than that of a third party who seeks visitation
rights to a child.33' As one commentator stated, "These [lesbian or
transgender] nonbiological parents are very different from third par-
custody is consistent with the best interest of the child." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACrS § 191 (1981). However, the Restatement also notes that "the fact that the person to
whom custody is transferred is a parent is an important, although not controlling, factor in show-
ing that the transfer is in the interest of the child." Id. § 191 cmt. a.
329. See UNI'. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (2000) (revised 2002); UNIw. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a)
(1973).
330. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 178 (Wash. 2005).
331. Id. at 178 ("'[A] fit parent's right vis-i-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-
A-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another."' (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57 100-01 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting))). The Washington Supreme Court held that
"the rights and responsibilities which we recognize as attaching to de facto parents do not in-
fringe on the fundamental liberty interests of the other legal parent in the family unit." Id. at
179.
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ties in that they actually plan and intend to be a parent to the child,
just as heterosexual married couples plan to have a child together." 332
Troxel places no "constitutional limitations on the ability of states
to legislatively, or through their common law, define a parent or fam-
ily." 3 3 3 The parental deference principle cannot be used to prohibit
nonbiological (but legal) parents from bringing contract claims for
custody or visitation to their children, or to prohibit the children from
bringing contract claims for access to their nonbiological parents.
Thus, because the nonbiological parents in these cases are not third
parties, but second parents, Troxel does not apply.
Second, even if Troxel did apply, the liberty interest should apply to
children as well as parents. As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in
Troxel,
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature
of a child's liberty interests in preserving established familial or
family-like bonds . . . it seems to me extremely likely that, to the
extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in
preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have
these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the
equation. . . . The constitutional protection against arbitrary state
interference with parental rights should not be extended to prevent
the States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of
parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the
welfare of the child. 334
If the courts were to recognize the child's liberty interest in "preserv-
ing established familial or family-like bonds," they would also recog-
nize that this interest is bolstered by the use of contract law to
establish parentage. As discussed above, the welfare of the child is
implicated when a biological parent terminates a longstanding paren-
tal relationship between the child and her nonbiological parent. The
child loses an established relationship with a parent, whom she has
known her entire life. Children have an undeniable interest in main-
taining the support of both of their parents. Contract law enables the
child to bring an action for her right to emotional and financial sup-
port from her nonbiological parent. Therefore, the use of contract law
to establish legal parentage bolsters the child's interest in maintaining
familial relationships and parental support by permitting the child to
enforce these rights.
332. Williams, supra note 214, at 427.
333. L.B., 122 P.3d at 178; see also Polikoff, supra note 323, at 834 ("The grandparents in
Troxel had never assumed a parental role in the children's lives. Thus, Troxel does not define
parenthood nor affect the ability of states to do so. Legally unrecognized lesbian mothers are
parents. ... Such recognition ... guarantees equal status for both parents.").
334. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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2. Courts Currently Use Contract Law to Establish Parentage or
Non-Parentage
Arguments that contract law has no place in a family law context
ignore the fact that contracts are already relied upon to determine
parentage in many situations. Some examples include the presump-
tions of parenthood that accompanies a marriage, Al contracts, and
surrogacy contracts. First, there is a "common law presumption that
the husband of a woman who gives birth to a child is the father of the
child."335 When a couple entered into a marriage, "[they] were [tradi-
tionally] agreeing to support and raise any children born to the mar-
riage. Because [they] agreed to raise children, they were bound to be
[parents], regardless of whether the children born to the marriage
were biologically related."33 6 This presumption may be rebuttable,
depending on the state.337
Second, in some states, sperm donors and heterosexual couples en-
gaging in Al currently rely on contracts to establish their parental sta-
tuses. The sperm donor signs a contract disavowing "his rights and
obligations as a father. The law honors the sperm donor's intent not
to be a father and the contract in which he makes that intent
known."338 The male partners of the biological mothers often sign
pre-insemination agreements establishing their intentions to be the
nonbiological, but legal, parents to the children.339 Under the UPA
and the adoptive states' statutes, courts recognize these parentage
contracts as valid by recognizing male nonbiological parents as legal
parents when the couple terminates its relationship. 340
Finally, most states also enforce surrogacy contracts, which deter-
mine the parentage and non-parentage of the intended parent and the
surrogate, respectively.341 It is "through the contract, not the genetic
contribution, that the 'intended' parents acquire their parental
rights."342 In Johnson v. Calvert, for example, both the surrogate birth
mother and the intended mother "presented acceptable proof of ma-
ternity," so the court stated that legal parentage of the child must be
335. Baker, supra note 327, at 12.
336. Id. at 25.
337. Id. at 12 (citing LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 995-96 (2d ed.
2000) ("Today, all states, by statute or common law, provide that a married woman's husband is
at least rebuttably presumed to be the father of her children.")).
338. Id. at 26.
339. See id.
340. See UNIF. PARENTAGE Act § 703 (2000) (revised 2002); UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 5(a)
(1973).
341. See Baker, supra note 327, at 26.
342. Id.
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decided by "enquiring into the parties' intentions as manifested in the
surrogacy agreement." 343 The court found that all three parties in-
tended to work together to bring the child into the world for the in-
tended parents.344 The birth mother was never intended to be the
child's mother. 345 The court repeated one commentator's argument
that "[w]ithin the context of artificial reproductive techniques . .. in-
tentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bar-
gained-for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood." 3 4 6
Using these principles, the court relied on the surrogacy contract in
this case to hold that the intended parents were the legal parents of
the child under California law. 3 4 7
Contract law is not just an appropriate means to determine parent-
age; it is a well-established tool in certain family law contexts. Similar
to the other contract applications in family law, a pre-insemination
parentage "contract between [a] lesbian [or transgender couple] pro-
motes rather than violates public policy by protecting the expectations
of the parties and encouraging the formation and stability of fami-
lies." 348 Therefore, it is appropriate to consider a solution in contract
law to the issue of parentage determinations for lesbian and trans-
gender nonbiological parents.
In sum, when a lesbian or transgender couple ends its relationship
and the biological parent attempts to terminate the nonbiological par-
ent's relationship with the child, the nonbiological parent has no other
choice but to turn to a legal system that currently applies varied prin-
ciples of law.3 4 9 With often inequitable outcomes for lesbian and
transgender persons across jurisdictions, a consistent disregard for the
parents' autonomous decisions to create a family, and a consistent dis-
regard for the best interest of the child, there is a need for a new
approach to parentage determinations for nonbiological parents.
Under a contractual framework, a child can bring an action as a third-
party beneficiary to a pre-insemination contract for specific perform-
ance of her nonbiological parent's support. The courts should recog-
nize contract principles as applicable to the creation of families, and
343. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 783 (quoting Shultz, supra note 244, at 323).
347. Id. at 787. The court discussed possible public policy arguments against enforcement of a
surrogacy contract, and held that the enforcement of the contract was not inconsistent with pub-
lic policy. See id. at 783-86.
348. See Sella, supra note 32, at 161-62.
349. Accord Jacobs, supra note 4, at 348; Williams, supra note 214, at 426.
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grant parentage to a child's nonbiological parent through a child's ac-
tion for the specific performance of the pre-insemination agreement.
IV. IMPACT
The current legal system for determining the parentage status of
nonbiological parents in AI cases disproportionately denies children
in lesbian or transgender families relationships with one of their par-
ents.350 When a court refuses to recognize a nonbiological parent's
standing to petition for custody or visitation due to her gender, mari-
tal status, or lack of a biological relation to the child, the child is ad-
versely affected by losing her "involved, nurturing, loving, and
supportive parents."35 The contractual model for determining par-
entage would treat children of lesbian or transgender couples the
same as children of heterosexual couples that use Al to conceive. Pa-
rental intent would govern parentage determinations, and children
would no longer be denied the support of their parents due to their
parents' gender or marital status.
Section A of this Part illustrates that unlike the current legal sys-
tem, contract law provides a uniform, equitable solution to the ques-
tion of nonbiological parentage, respecting both the best interest of
the children and the parents' autonomous decision to parent their
children together.352 Section B of this Part discusses the substance
and implementation of the pre-insemination parentage contracts.353
A. Strengths in a Contract Approach to Parentage Determinations
As discussed above, the current system for determining parentage
in Al cases disadvantages both lesbian or transgender nonbiological
parents and their children. Courts often reject lesbian or transgender
nonbiological parents' claims of parentage under various statutes or
common law doctrine, disregarding the parties' autonomous decision
to co-parent the children and the best interests of the children. The
various statutes and common law doctrines also yield inconsistent and
often inequitable results for lesbian and transgender families. The en-
forcement of AI contracts in parentage determinations would resolve
these issues for lesbian or transgender nonbiological parents and their
children. The application of contract law in this context would estab-
lish a uniform approach across jurisdictions, yield equitable results for
350. See supra note 2.
351. Jacobs, supra note 4, at 350.
352. See infra notes 354-73 and accompanying text.
353. See infra notes 374-85 and accompanying text.
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all families, respect the parties' autonomous decisions to co-parent,
and take into account the best interests of the children.
First, a contract approach to all parentage determinations would al-
leviate inconsistency in the law by creating uniform standards across
jurisdictions, regardless of the parties' gender or marital statuses.354
In most states, lesbian and transgender nonbiological parents cannot
rely on state statutes to protect their parentage rights. 355 Many courts
also do not apply the relevant common law doctrines to same-sex
couples, even where they do apply those doctrines to heterosexual
couples.356 If, regardless of their jurisdiction, all nonbiological parents
were able to rely on the courts to enforce private contracts that clearly
indicate their intentions to co-parent children, there would be
"[p]redictable and consistent results in every state."357 This "would
keep [biological parents] from forum shopping, disrupting families
and relocating children in order to obtain a ruling that might preclude
the other party from claiming parental rights" and nonbiological par-
ents from doing the same in order to find a jurisdiction that grants
them standing to bring custody and visitation claims.358
Second, although the law "provides parental status to heterosexual
married" nonbiological parents, "[the] courts refuse to extend the
same rights and obligations to members of same-sex couples." 359
While some courts cite the gender of lesbian or transgender nonbio-
logical parents as the reason they cannot establish parentage under
their statutes or common law doctrines, others cite their marital sta-
tus. 360 Regardless of the reason for the courts' refusal to treat these
nonbiological parents differently, it is an inequitable result for lesbian
and transgender nonbiological parents and their children. As com-
mentators have noted, "Equity and reason should hold that those par-
ties who joined together with the intent to create a child-whether
gay, straight, unmarried, or married-should be allowed to legally
protect their interests as legal parents." 361 The enforcement of pre-
insemination parentage contracts would provide an equal opportunity
354. Under the contract approach, courts would determine parentage based on the existence
of a pre-insemination contract, regardless of marital status or gender. See supra notes 290-348
and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 43-102 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 139-206 and accompanying text.
357. Horstmeyer, supra note 17, at 699-700.
358. Id. at 700.
359. Williams, supra note 214, at 422.
360. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 311 (lll. App. Ct. 2005); White v.
White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
361. Fiser & Garrett, supra note 242, at 28.
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for lesbian and transgender nonbiological parents to establish full pa-
rental status, regardless of their gender or marital status.
Third, unlike some heterosexual couples who accidentally create a
child through intercourse, a couple that uses Al to conceive has gener-
ally made the autonomous decision to bear a child and parent that
child together. 362 A pre-insemination contract can provide a clear in-
dication of a couple's intent to co-parent a child conceived through
AI. 36 3 In fact, some same-sex couples enter into these agreements "to
serve as evidence of their intent at the time they decided to have a
child, rather than assessing their intent following their separation."3 6
As one commentator notes, "[B]ecause its terms are drafted specifi-
cally for each couple, [a] contract best reflects the wishes of each les-
bian [or transgender] couple."365
Some state statutes explicitly take note of the parties' intent to co-
parent a child conceived through Al. As noted above, the UPA
(2000), which only applies to heterosexual couples, bases parentage
determinations on the parties' intent to parent children together. As
one commentator stated, "(Tjhe court's failure to recognize the nonbi-
ological parent in a same-sex couple as a legal parent to the child ig-
nores the fact that he or she consented to the production of the child.
This denies the nonbiological parent the parental rights he or she vol-
untarily assumed .... ."366 Parents, regardless of their gender or mari-
tal status, should be able to rely on the courts to enforce their
informed and autonomous decisions to parent a child as laid out in
their private contracts. 367
Fourth, "[t]he law of contracts offers a solution for children raised
in lesbian [or transgender] coparent relationships that is consistent
with the best interests of those children." 368 If the courts enforce pre-
insemination agreements establishing the parentage of the nonbiologi-
cal parent, the child will have access to two parents. It is in a child's
best interest to have "two parents, rather than one, as a source of both
emotional and financial support, especially when the obligation to
support the child would otherwise fall to the public." 369
362. Id. at 27.
363. Id.
364. See Williams, supra note 214, at 428.
365. See Sella, supra note 32, at 162.
366. Williams, supra note 214, at 423.
367. Accord Fiser & Garrett, supra note 242, at 30.
368. Durkin, supra note 19, at 342.
369. Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660, 669 (Cal. 2005); see also In
re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1038 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005). The New Jersey
Superior Court stated,
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Terminating the child's relationship with her nonbiological parent
does more than remove a source of child support from the child's life;
it causes a lack of security and stability.370 As one commentator
notes, "Continuity and consistency are fundamental requirements for
a child's healthy development."37 1 These concerns are as applicable to
children of lesbian and transgender parents as they are to children of
heterosexual parents. 372 While the current system does not provide a
solution for children of same-sex parents consistent with their best in-
terests, enforcing parentage contracts between couples undergoing Al
would provide all children with the support of both parents.
In the hypothetical situation laid out in this Comment's introduc-
tion, the lesbian couple made the decision to have a family together.
They expressed their intentions to co-parent their child by signing a
pre-insemination parentage agreement. This agreement explicitly
stated that both partners would be legal parents to the child. They
were their daughter's co-parents for ten years. Yet, when they ended
their relationship, the courts denied the ten-year-old girl the support
of her nonbiological mother, despite the existence of a private, signed
agreement between her parents stating their intentions to co-parent
their child together. Had the girl's parents been in a heterosexual re-
lationship, their pre-insemination parentage contract would have been
enforceable under the state's parentage laws. The nonbiological
mother would have had standing to bring action for the enforcement
of the contract, and the child's relationship with her nonbiological
mother would have been effectively uninterrupted by the legal system.
Instead, the state parentage act's exclusion of same-sex couples
"cause[d] the severance of a valued parent-child relationship and
force[d] [the] child to lose a person . . . she has known as nothing
other than a parent for . . . her entire life." 373
The law of contracts provides the best solution. If the private agree-
ment establishing legal parentage was enforceable in court, the girl
would still have the support of and a relationship with her nonbiologi-
cal mother. Her parents' intentions to create a family and co-parent
Arguably, the benefits to a child of having two legal parents are numerous and would
certainly include economic security such as the right to support, the right to inherit by
intestacy ... and the right to inherit free of the fifteen percent New Jersey inheritance
tax. Additionally, the child would be eligible for health insurance as a dependent ...
and would be entitled to insurance and social security benefits in the event of [the
nonbiological parent's] death.
Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1038.
370. See Durkin, supra note 19, at 346.
371. Id. at 345-46.
372. See Williams, supra note 214, at 425 (citing Jacobs, supra note 4, at 375).
373. Williams, supra note 214, at 425.
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their children would be respected. It takes into account what is in her
best interest, as she is best served by having access to both of her fit,
loving parents. Finally, this is the only equitable result for the nonbio-
logical mother and her daughter. To remove this child's mother from
her life simply because her parents were in a same-sex relationship
discriminates against her for not being the child of a heterosexual
couple.
In sum, the courts, using state statutes and various common law
doctrines, often fail to recognize lesbian or transgender nonbiological
parents as second parents to children conceived through Al. A con-
tract law solution rightfully provides the children of all parents who
use Al-regardless of gender or marital status-with two legal par-
ents to provide support, so long as they both intended to co-parent the
child together.
B. Substance and Implementation of Pre-Insemination
Parentage Contracts
Pre-insemination parentage agreements "are legal documents that a
. couple uses to explain the rights and responsibilities of each co-
parent." 374 The document "should state clearly the parties' intention
that the wife be inseminated ... [and] that the child so conceived shall
be treated as the natural child of the parties."375 The agreements also
bar the donor from bringing a parentage claim. The physician often
provides the form, and an attorney for one of the parties may make
changes to the standard form.3 7 6 In practice, the biological parent, the
nonbiological parent, and the supervising physician all often sign the
agreement.377
While couples' pre-insemination parentage contracts will not be
identical, In re Marriage of Simmons provides an example of an agree-
ment that would have been a legally binding document had the nonbi-
ological partner been legally married to his wife:
"It is further agreed that [at] the moment of conception, the hus-
band hereby accepts the act as his own, and agrees:
1. That such child or children so produced are his own legiti-
mate child or children and are heirs of his body; and
2. That he hereby completely waives forever any right which
he might have to disclaim such child or children as his own;
and
374. Osborne, supra note 139, at 370 (citing Rompala, supra note 6, at 1946).
375. ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY CASES § 17.03 (1983).
376. Id.
377. Id.
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3. That such child or children so procedure [sic] are, and shall
be considered to be, in all respects including descent of
property, child or children of his own body."378
However, as a transsexual male who had not yet completed his sex
reassignment surgery, the Illinois court found the nonbiological parent
legally female. 379 Therefore, his marriage to the female biological
parent was an invalid same-sex marriage, and the pre-insemination
parentage agreement was unenforceable.380
To protect children from losing their relationships with their lesbian
or transgender nonbiological parents, pre-insemination agreements
should be gender neutral, use the gender of the nonbiological parent,
or specifically name the nonbiological partner as the legal co-parent.
For example,
It is further agreed that at the moment of conception, [the nonbio-
logical parent] hereby accepts the act as his/her own, and agrees:
1. That such child or children so produced are [his/her] own
legitimate child or children and are heirs of [his/her] body;
and
2. That [(s)he] hereby completely waives forever any right
which [(s)he] might have to disclaim such child or children
as [his/her] own; and
3. That such child or children are, and shall be considered to
be, in all respects including descent of property, child or
children of [his/her] own body.
Had the parties in Simmons used the gender-neutral agreement
above, the Illinois court would still not be likely to grant the nonbio-
logical parent standing to seek custody or visitation of the child under
state law. 38 1 The Illinois Parentage Act, which uses the language of
the UPA (1973), only protects nonbiological parents that are legally
married.382
However, in states that have gender-neutral statutes or no applica-
ble parentage statues, courts could enforce the gender-neutral parent-
age agreement above for a lesbian or transgender couple within state
law. In those states with gender-specific parentage statutes, the courts
should follow New Jersey and California courts in interpreting those
378. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting the parties' agreement).
379. Id. at 309.
380. Id.
381. The court stated, "It is clear from reading the statute in question that the legislature
intended that this statute apply to 'husbands' and 'wives' as those terms are ordinarily and popu-
larly understood." Id. at 311.
382. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3 (2008).
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statutes to include same-sex couples.383 In Robinson, for example, the
New Jersey court noted that although the state parentage statute ap-
plied only to "husbands" and "wives" on its face, the lesbian couple
had clearly demonstrated their intent to parent the child together.38
Therefore, the court granted legal parent status to the nonbiological
parent.385
In sum, where the current system fails the children of lesbian and
transgender nonbiological parents, contract law should protect them.
When the courts consider parties' pre-insemination agreements to be
contracts establishing the legal parentage of the nonbiological parents,
they respect the autonomous decisions of those parties to parent, re-
gardless of their marital status or gender. Furthermore, while the con-
tracts may vary slightly by couple, consistent judicial enforcement of
these contracts will result in predictable solutions for nonbiological
parents. These parents will be able to protect their relationships with
their children by entering into pre-insemination parentage agreements
before conception. Finally, consistent enforcement of pre-insemina-
tion parentage agreements is also in the best interest of the children,
who are better served by maintaining relationships with both fit
parents.
V. CONCLUSION
In the case of Susan and Jane, the courts denied Jane standing to
fight for custody or visitation of Lesley. After ten years of being a
parent, Jane was left without means to access her child. This tragic
outcome is not uncommon. Courts often deny children conceived
through Al in non-heterosexual families the support of their nonbio-
logical parents, even when they would recognize parentage in a heter-
osexual family with the same fact pattern.
The current system disadvantages same-sex couples and their chil-
dren. It yields inequitable results for lesbian and transgender families,
is far from uniform across jurisdictions, disregards the parties' autono-
mous decisions to create families, and most importantly, disregards
the best interests of the children in these custody battles. Therefore,
there is a need for a more equitable and uniform approach to parent-
age determinations.
The law of contracts provides that approach. A couple preparing to
undergo Al to conceive a child often signs a private pre-insemination
383. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660, 664 (Cal. 2005); In re
Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 1041 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005).
384. Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1041.
385. Id. at 1042.
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agreement establishing the legal parentage of the nonbiological par-
ent. These agreements are valid contracts, illustrating both parents'
intentions to grant legal parentage to the nonbiological parent. When
Susan terminates the relationship between Jane and Lesley, she
breaches that contract. As a third-party beneficiary to a pre-insemina-
tion parentage agreement between her biological and nonbiological
parents, Lesley should be able to bring an action for specific perform-
ance of Jane's financial and emotional support.
Allowing these contracts to be enforceable in court ensures that
children like Lesley will no longer be denied parental support, simply
because of their parents' gender or marital status. A contract ap-
proach is also consistent with the best interest of the children at issue.
Instead of being traumatized by the loss of her second mother, who
has provided her love and support throughout her entire life, Lesley
would be entitled to bring action for the specific performance of that
parental relationship. Finally, enforcement of pre-insemination con-
tracts respects the intentions of the parties to create families. Instead
of denying Lesley and Jane their cherished parent-child relationship,
a court should enforce Jane and Susan's parentage agreement and al-
low Lesley the opportunity to grow up with the love and support of
both of her parents.
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